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NOTES
BAD CURES FOR BAD BABIES: POLICY CHALLENGES TO THE
STATUTORY REMOVAL OF THE COMMON LAW CLAIM FOR
BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES
INTRODUCTION
When Marie Anderson went into labor, the hospital staff failed
to carefully momtor her dangerously high blood pressure or detect
warning signs of Pregnancy Induced Hypertension ("PIW'),' a con-
dition known to cause oxygen depnvation during labor and deliv-
ery, or intrapartum asphyxia.2 As a result, her infant was born
with severe and permanent brain damage In Anderson v. United
1. Anderson v. United States, 731 F. Supp. 391, 394-95 (D.N.D. 1990). "PIH is a
condition that involves constriction of the placental blood vessels allowing less oxygen to
the fetus. This lack of oxygen can permanently destroy brain cells PIH in a labor-
mg patient, even if only mild hypertension, can therefore constitute a high-risk condition
for her and her fetus." Id. at 394.
2. At milder levels of asphyxia, the fetal or newborn physiology will respond to the
decrease in oxygen by maximizing blood flow to the brain at the possible expense of
other organs. More severe or prolonged asphyxia affects the flow of oxygen to the fetal
brain, causing permanent brain damage. STANLEY S. SCHwARTz & NORMAN D. TUCKER,
2 HANDLING BIRTH TRAUMA CASES §§ 23.1-.3 (1989). See infra notes 95-102 and ac-
companying text.
3. See Anderson, 731 F. Supp. at 395-98 (finding causation for the infant's brain
damage and cerebral palsy in the hospital's negligent failure to diagnose PIH or the
infant's resulting intrapartum asphyxia). The infant, Casey Anderson, is unable- to walk,
talk, or see. He is unable to control his bowels, and must be fed through a tube in his
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States,4 the court held that the hospital was negligent in failing to
properly monitor and diagnose the mother's condition, and that its
negligence directly caused the resulting injuries.' In a Virginia
malpractice action, Boyd v. Bulala,6 an obstetrician ordered the
delivery room nurses not to call him to the hospital until his
patient's labor reached the "crowning" stage.' As a result, the ob-
stetrician was not present when an emergency arose. The patient,
Helen Boyd, was attended during labor and delivery only by nurs-
es, none of whom were trained in emergency obstetric measures
which would have prevented the resulting injury.8 The infant suf-
fered "profound physical and mental handicaps" and later died as a
result of oxygen deprivation prior to and immediately following her
birth.9 The jury found the obstetrician negligent in failing to pro-
vide adequate medical care during labor and delivery.'0
The type of negligence occurring in Anderson and Boyd is not
uncommon. Claims alleging birth-related neurological impairment
account for more suits against obstetricians than any other obstetric
injury." Due to the severity of the injury when negligence occurs,
successful claims for birth-related neurological injuries also result
in the largest damage awards." Historically, these claims have
abdomen at two hour intervals. He requires 24-hour supervision, skilled nursing care to
provide feedings, and medication daily. These injuries are all attributed to a lack of oxy-
gen to his brain during birth. Id. at 399.
4. 731 F. Supp. 391 (D.N.D. 1990).
5. Id. at 395, 398.
6. 647 F. Supp. 781, 784 (W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d
1191 (4th Cir. 1989), certifying questions to Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990),
conformed to answers of certified question, 905 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1990).
7. Boyd, 647 F. Supp. at 784. Crowning is a stage late in labor, when the fetal head
becomes visible. Evidence showed that the defendant obstetrician knew this procedure was
below the reasonable standard of care, and realized that his order to be called after
crowning posed a risk to the patient. Id. at 793. The "[diefendant's own expert agreed
that defendant's conduct could be termed 'egregious."' Id. at 791.
8. Id. at 784.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS REPORT 1988;
Cynthia L. Gallup, Can No-Fault Compensation of Impaired Infants Alleviate the Malprac-
tice Crisis in Obstetrics?, 14 1. HEALTH, POL., POL'Y & L. 691, 692 (1989).
12. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS REPORT 1988. See
also Richard P. Perkins, Perspectives on Perinatal Brain Damage, 69 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 807, 807 (1987) (commenting that there is a "current epidemic of malprac-
tice litigation" relating to perinatal brain damage).
Not only is the cost of future care high due to the severity of these injuries, but as
the court in Anderson noted, damage awards in these cases may also be enormous, as
these are infants who would otherwise have been born normal. Anderson v. United States,
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been treated like any other medical malpractice action, with victims
of obstetric injury having access to the tort system. Currently,
however, the ability of plaintiffs like Anderson and Boyd to bring
such claims has been threatened by a new wave of legislative
reform proposing and implementing the removal of the most severe
birth-related injuries from the tort system. 3 The increased focus
on the legal treatment of this narrow category of obstetric injury
claims is said to be in response to concerns regarding the impact
on the practice of obstetrics of increases in the frequency and
severity14 of medical malpractice claims, and the corresponding
rise in the cost of malpractice insurance. 5
Since 1970, forty-nine states have adopted some element of
tort reform to address medical malpractice claims generally, 6 with
731 F. Supp. 391, 398 (D.N.D.) 1990). In Anderson, the plaintiffs were awarded $2.4
million for the cost of caring for the child, $760,000 for lost earnings, $160,000 for in-
curred medical expenses, and $525,000 for lost consortium. Id. at 399, 402.
In Boyd, the district court found that the jury's award of $8.3 million was not ex-
cessive in light of the severity of the injury. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 793
(W.D. Va. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989), certifying
questions to Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990), conformed to answers of certi-
fied question, 905 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ulti-
mately reversed the District Court and reduced the $8.3 million award on the sole ground
that it exceeded Virginia's statutory limit on damages. Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 767
(4th Cir. 1990). See also Scott v. United States, 884 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir. 1989) (uphold-
ing general validity of a $10.7 million award - including $2 million in noneconomic
damages - and remanding solely to require the district court to recompute the present
value of the lost wages and medical care services portion of the economic damages in a
birth asphyxia case); Nelson v. Trinity Medical Center, 419 N.W.2d 886 (N.D. 1988)
(allowing $5.7 million verdict for brain damage to infant caused by unmonitored fetal
distress).
13. See infra Part IV.
14. The terms "frequency" and "severity" are used to represent the increased number
of claims being filed and the high dollar amounts being requested and awarded as dam-
ages in medical malpractice claims. See Peter H. White, Note, Innovative No-Fault Tort
Reform for an Endangered Specialty, 74 VA. L. Rnv. 1487, 1495-96 nn.43-44. White
notes that "while the number of claims filed per 100 physicians between 1981 and 1985
climbed from 3.2 to 10.1 for all physicians, it climbed from 7.1 to 26.6 for specialists in
obstetrics-gynecology." Id. at 1496 n.44. Also, White notes that the severity of obstetrics
claims has risen sharply, from an average cost per claim of $70,997 for the period be-
tween 1979 and 1983 to an average cost per claim of $119,249 in 1986. Id.
15. See 1 INSTrrUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND THE DELiv-
ERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 112-15 (1989) [hereinafter 1 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE] (princi-
pal factors in the growth of premiums appear to be increased frequency and severity of
claims and lower interest rates, reducing insurers' investment income). See generally id. at
1-13 (discussing the increased frequency and severity of obstetric claims and the effect on
the delivery of obstetric care).
16. Id. at 126. For a broad overview of malpractice reforms, see Randall R. Bovbjerg,
Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a Preliminary Report
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the majority of reform efforts aimed at limiting aspects of tort
claims. 7 More recently, however, tort system critics have pro-
posed the adoption of alternatives which, rather than reforming or
limiting the tort system, seek to replace it completely for certain
injury categories. A primary target for the new proposals are the
severe birth-related injuries occurring in obstetrics. Several states
have enacted or are currently considering legislation replacing
negligence claims for this specific category of severe obstetric
injuries. 8
Proponents of the removal of birth-related neurological injuries
from the traditional tort scheme have recommended three basic
systems to address these injuries: 1) a "no fault" system, 9 2) an
"accelerated compensation event" system,' ° and 3) an administra-
tive fault-based system." Of these three alternative systems being
proposed, only the third maintains the element of "fault."
Proponents of "no-fault" have recommended replacing the tort
adjudicatory system with an administrative agency system, com-
pensating birth-related neurological injuries irrespective of fault.
Two states, Florida and Virginia, ' have legislatively enacted
forms of this "no-fault," with other states currently considering
implementing similar proposals.' The second type of system be-
ing proposed recommends an alternative insurance system that
would remove this category and specified other severe obstetric
Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 499, 521-32 (1989) (outlining tort reforms through the
1970s).
17. See infra notes 76-86 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Plan, FLA. STAT.
ANN. §§ 766.303-.316 (West Supp. 1992); Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Com-
pensation Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990). See also White,
supra note 14, at 1499 n.58 (noting legislative proposals in Illinois and North Carolina
for removing certain birth-related injuries from the tort system). New York has also con-
sidered a proposal for an alternative system for obstetric injuries (the New York State
Neurological Impaired Infant Compensation Act) that would compensate qualifying medi-
cally impaired newborns, irrespective of proving physician fault. The New York proposal
is currently being redrafted. Many of these proposals have attempted to expand the range
of compensable events, presumably to greater reduce the risk of borderline claims falling
within the tort system. For example, Maryland considered expanding the range of com-
pensable injuries in its proposed no-fault insurance program to specifically include cerebral
palsy. Gallup, supra note 11, at 692.
19. See infra Part IV.A.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See infra Part IV.C.
22. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 766.303-.316 (West Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §§
38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990).
23. See supra note 18.
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injuries from tort litigation. This "accelerated-compensation event"
system ("ACE") would instead have private or social insurance
compensate predefined injuries.24 Like the legislative "no-fault"
systems being proposed and enacted in various states, an ACE
system does not maintain the element of "fault" in its operation.a
Finally, in an effort to address perceived flaws in the above pro-
posals, the American Medical Association, in conjunction with
thirty-one medical specialty societies, has proposed an administra-
tive fault-based system to replace the tort system.26 Obstetrics in
particular is being advocated as a testing ground for implementa-
tion. 7
Proponents of the alternative systems justify the exclusive
treatment of obstetric injuries on the grounds of the unique impact
of the increased frequency and severity of obstetric injury claims
on the practice of obstetrics.' Yet not only does evidence demon-
strate that the litigation experience in obstetrics is substantially
similar to that of other specialized practice areas,29 but selective
treatment for other types of claims has been rejected in at least one
state giving obstetric injuries such special treatment." In addition,
24. Bovbjerg et al., Obstetrics and Malpractice: Evidence on the Performance of a Se-
lective No-Fault System, 265 JAMA 2836, 2836 (1991). See infra Part IV.B.
25. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 2836. ACE is viewed as a "selective no-fault'
system because it is somewhat of a hybrid, having both fault and no-fault attributes. ACE
is like a no-fault system in that it promptly pays for pre-defined injuries without adjudi-
cating fault for each individual claim. However, ACE has some attributes of fault-based
systems in that it bases the classes of claims for which it will compensate on statistical
preventability. Id. at 2837.
26. AMA-SPEcIALTY SocIETY's MEDICAL LIABILITY PRoJEcr, A PROPOSED ALTERNA-
IVE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILITY DISPUTES: A
FAULT-BASED ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (1988) [hereinafter AMA PROPOSAL].
27. See Roger J. Bulger & Victoria P. Rostow, Medical Professional Liability and the
Delivery of Obstetrical Care, 6 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 81, 88-90 (1990) (rec-
ommending that states focus on alternatives to the tort system for obstetric injuries, in-
cluding the AMA's fault-based administrative system); David L. Sieradzki, Throwing Out
the Baby with the Bathwater: Reform in the System for Compensating Obstetric Accidents,
7 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 538, 547-48 (1989) (considering implementation of the AMA's
proposed system for obstetric injuries).
28. See supra note 14.
29. See generally 1 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 92-123 (comparison of
medical practice areas, noting high cost distinctions between malpractice insurance premi-
ums paid by obstetricians and general family practitioners, yet less disparity between ob-
stetricians and surgeons, another high-risk specialty).
30. The Virginia legislature was the first to adopt a no-fault scheme for obstetric inju-
ries. However, in 1987, the Virginia General Assembly had refused to adopt a limit on
noneconomic damages which would have affected all tort victims, or legislation mandating
periodic payment of damage awards. See Jane R. Ward, Comment, Virginia's Birth-Related
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advocates of alternative measures are not primarily arguing that
these claims are not the result of negligence or unavoidable inju-
ry.3 Rather, they assert that the increased frequency and severity
of these claims impose high costs on the obstetric malpractice
system, which in turn affects the practice of obstetrics.32
To some degree, this assertion is accurate. Damage awards are
higher for this particular category of injury than for most other
claims. While economic damages are calculated in relation to tangi-
ble economic costs, compensation for pain and suffering frequently
makes up nearly half of the damage award for a successful birth-
related neurological injury claim. 33 However, rather than address-
ing frequency of claims by imposing deterrent mechanisms de-
signed to reduce the occurrence of negligence, the alternative sys-
tems may in fact underdeter negligence, as physicians may perceive
that they can no longer be held liable for their mistakes. 4 Further,
even though the alternative systems may compensate a larger num-
ber of injured infants than would recover under the tort system,
this broader recovery is likely to be at the expense of those infants
most severely injured by their obstetricians' negligence.35 Finally,
if the focus of the alternative systems is to reduce the severity of
the awards, the question arises whether this cannot be adequately
addressed within the present tort system through a modification,
rather than abrogation, of the common law approach.
This note examines the treatment of birth-related neurological
Neurological Injury Compensation Act: Constitutional and Policy Challenges, 22 U. RICH.
L. REv. 431, 442, 444-45 nn.89-90 (1988).
31. Evidence shows that many obstetric injuries are both caused by negligence and are
avoidable. See infra notes 162-68, 246-52 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 82-86, 112-14 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 286-87 and accompanying text.
34. See White, supra note 14, at 1502 n.74. White states:
The fear, in other words, is that participating obstetricians will perceive that
they cannot be held liable, regardless of the quality of their care for the birth
of severely injured infants and that they will have a decreased incentive to
ensure that their patients do not suffer "birth-related neurological injuries." An
obstetrician has an obvious self-interest in having an injured infant whose deliv-
ery he attended come within the Program's compensation system, because such
a finding would absolve him of liability for that child's injuries.
Id. See also Gallup, supra note 11, at 692. Gallup argues that although removing the
most severely injured children from the tort system will give "immediate financial relief to
obstetricians," such removal "also threatens to lead to an increase in the incidence of
birth-related injuries, since obstetricians are absolved of financial responsibility for this
class of injury." Id.
35. Gallup, supra note 11, at 702.
1304 [Vol. 43:1299
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injuries and the question of whether special legislation categorically
removing these injuries from the tort system is justified. The three
alternative proposals discussed above will be analyzed, with prima-
ry focus placed on the no-fault statutes.36 All three systems repre-
sent drastic changes in the way a victim of severe obstetric injury
would bring a claim for medical malpractice, ultimately abolishing
the right to a common law cause of action. The note will evaluate
these alternative systems in terms of how they correspond to the
fault and causation elements of a tort claim for negligence,' and
in regard to their potential to compensate victims of birth-related
injuries3' and to deter negligence .3  Part I of the note considers
the traditional approach of tort law in addressing a claim of medi-
cal malpractice. Part II addresses the background of the medical
malpractice crisis as it relates to obstetrics and the move from
general to directed reform." Part III outlines the features of
claims of birth-related neurological injuries,42 which are the focus
of the directed reform, with Part IV introducing the alternative
systems under consideration 3 Part V begins by considering the
implications of selective treatment, analyzing the possibility of
constitutional and policy challenges to abrogation of the tort
claim," and the possible effects of the alternative systems on the
frequency and severity of obstetric injury from negligence.4" Part
V also analyzes the justifications given for selective treatment of
these claims and errors in the underlying assertions used to justify
alternative treatment, focusing on the effect of removing claims
from juries and charges of "defensive medicine" within the tort
system.47 Implications of the proposed systems in terms of meet-
ing the tort objectives of imposing liability for fault, and compen-
36. Additional focus is placed on "no-fault" systems because "no-fault" systems (and
modifications of "no-fault") are currently receiving the most legislative consideration. See
supra note 18.
37. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
40. See infra Part L
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra Part IV.
44. See infra notes 205-16 and accompanying text.
45. See infra Part V.A.1.
46. See infra Part V.A.2.
47. See infra Part V.A.3.
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sating and deterring injury, are also considered." Consideration is
also given to the performance of the tort system in meeting these
objectives.
Part VI argues that the legislative focus on removal of this
narrow category of severe injuries from the tort system unduly
threatens the rights of victims of birth-related neurological injuries.
This note concludes by making recommendations for reducing the
impact of the severity of birth-related neurological injury claims on
the cost of obstetric practice by restructuring tort damage awards.
Such an approach is needed to maintain the deterrent benefits of
the tort system which legislative alternatives have failed to repli-
cate.
I. TRADITIONAL TORT LAW APPROACH TO MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE CLAIMS
Medical malpractice has traditionally been governed by tort
law.49 Under the tort system, a person who is injured by the acts
of another has a right to bring a civil claim for compensation."
To recover for negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence
of: (1) a duty on the part of the physician toward the plaintiff; (2)
a violation of that duty (as measured by the applicable standard of
care); (3) the presence of a compensable injury; and (4) a causal
connection between the violation of the standard of care and the
injury.51
Liability for medical malpractice is premised upon "fault" on
the part of the defendant which is the legal cause of the plaintiffs
injury.52 Even in the early history of tort law, when liability with-
out fault was standard in other areas, a distinction was made re-
garding the liability of physicians. 3 This distinction was based on
a belief that the practice of medicine was a social good, and that
doctors should not be made to pay simply because their actions
48. See infra Parts V.B, C.
49. See SYLVIA LAW & STEVEN POLAN, PAIN AND PROFIT: THE POLITICS OF MAL-
PRACTICE 1 (1978) ("Today, liability based on 'fault' is the major premise of the tort
system. Malpractice . . . is a fault-based system.").
50. See W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2,
at 7 (5th ed. 1984).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965).
52. See LAW & POLAN, supra note 49, at 3.
53. Law and Polan point out that "during the heyday of liability without fault, phy-
sicians were not to be held liable unless it was proved . . . that the doctor's particular
action demonstrated ignorance or lack of skill." Id. at 7.
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produced injury, but only when their actions were found to be
unreasonable or lacking in due care.' Current legal theory contin-
ues to support the notion that the physician should only pay when
at fault."
The justifications for imposing tort liability on the negligent
actor can be summarized as follows: First, the imposition of tort
liability serves to compensate the victims of negligence for their
injuries; second, it deters behavior society deems to be unreason-
able.56 Tort law seeks to allocate the cost of losses resulting from
human activity' by compensating those injured by the negligent
acts of another. 8 Full tort damages generally include both eco-
nomic losses, such as medical costs and loss of future earnings, as
well as noneconomic losses, such as pain and suffering awards
determined by a jury.59 The calculation of damages can be partic-
ularly high in obstetric injury claims due to the severity of some
54. l at 6-8. This distinction for medical malpractice was noted as early as 1767. See
id. at 6 (referring to Slater v. Baker and Stapleton, 95 Eng. Rpt. 860, 862 (K.B. 1767)).
55. See KEETON ET AL, supra note 50, § 4, at 21-23 (imposing liability for "legal" or
"social" fault); see also LAW & POLAN, supra note 49, at 1-2. The authors comment on
the evolution of the law to a tort system that is now fault-based:
If people were required to pay the victim whenever their actions caused physi-
cal injury to another, there would be strong incentives to be careful, and also
to abstain from activities which are dangerous to people even when carefully
done . . . This was in fact the operable principle of our own liability system
until the last hundred years. [This was derived from t]he primitive Germanic
concept . . . that "the doer of a deed was responsible whether he acted inno-
cently or inadvertently, because he was the doer."
.... In the last half of the nineteenth century, with the coming of
the Industrial Revolution, [this] principle was stood on its head . . . . The
exceptions swallowed the rule, and the rule became that the victim must prove
"fault" in order to recover payment from the person who caused the injuries.
Id
56. See PATRICIA M. DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND PUB-
Lic POLICY 3 (1985), where the author states:
The tort system of liability for negligence has two main purposes. First, it
provides compensation to those injured as a result of the negligence of others,
thereby acting as a source of insurance. Second, by imposing sanctions on
persons found negligent, it acts as a deterrent to future negligent behavior.
Id. See also LAW & POLAN, supra note 49, at 1 (noting that the two basic rationales for
imposing liability for negligence are deterrence and compensation).
57. KEETON ET AL., supra note 50, § 1, at 6 ("The law of torts . . . is concerned
with the allocation of losses arising out of human activities.") See also LAW & POLAN,
supra note 49, at 1.
58. KEETON Er AL., supra note 50, § 1, at 6 ("So far as there is one central idea, it
would seem that it is that liability must be based upon conduct which is socially unrea-
sonable:').
59. See SCHWARTZ & TUCKER, supra note 2, §§ 6.8-.11 (outlining economic and
noneconomic damages available in birth injury cases).
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injuries resulting in high medical costs,' the increased length of
time in estimating lost future earnings for an infant,6 and higher
than average awards for noncompensatory damages. 2
In addition to compensating the victim for the injury, the tort
system seeks to deter future occurrence of the injury, through both
economic' and moral deterrence.' Some argue that deterrence is
the primary value of maintaining the tort system.
Until recently, the practice of obstetrics has not been regarded
as requiring special rules.' However, recent changes in medical
malpractice generally and the practice of obstetrics specifically have
prompted increased focus on reform efforts targeting obstetric inju-
ry claims.67 Since the 1970s, attention has been placed on what
has been characterized as a medical malpractice "crisis"' - the
increased frequency and severity 9 of malpractice claims, and a
corresponding rise in the cost of malpractice insurance." The fol-
60. Sieradzki, supra note 27, at 539-40.
61. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 12.
62. See infra notes 235, 286-87 and accompanying text.
63. See generally, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic
Theory of Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1981) (suggesting that judges, when de-
ciding cases, should attempt to promote the most efficient allocation of resources).
64. See Peter A. Bell, Legislative Intrusions into the Common Law of Medical Mal-
practice: Thoughts about the Deterrent Effect of Tort Liability, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV.
939, 992 (1984) (concluding that the essential deterrent value of the tort system is psy-
chological: "the declaration of wrongfulness and the social stigma that goes with
[it] ....").
65. See id. at 990-93. See also DANZON, supra note 56, at 9 (primary rationale for
tort liability is deterrence).
66. See Richard A. Epstein, Market and Regulatory Approaches to Medical Malprac-
tice: The Virginia Obstetrical No-Fault Statute, 74 VA. L. REV. 1451, 1452 (1988) (call-
ing the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act an "ominouso excep-
tion to the general approach" of the medical malpractice system).
67. See supra note 18.
68. The use of quotation marks around the word "crisis" indicates the lack of consen-
sus among commentators over the precise definition of the term. Bovbjerg, supra note 16,
at 500 n.1 ("The quotation marks reflect the lack of consensus about the precise extent of
problems and their social import ....').
For example, Danzon would presumably argue that the "crisis" is the high rate of
negligence that occurs without the victims ever filing malpractice claims. See DANZON,
supra note 56, at 28-29. On the other hand, Law and Polan view the crisis as a much
broader problem that runs through the basic economic structures of medicine, law, and the
insurance industry. LAW & POLAN, supra note 49, at xiii.
69. As noted supra note 14, the term "frequency" refers to the number of claims filed
and "severity" refers to the dollar amount requested and awarded as damages in medical
malpractice claims.
70. See Bovbjerg, supra note 16, at 502-03 (discussing the large increases in the cost
of malpractice insurance caused by increased frequency and severity of claims).
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lowing section describes initial reform efforts to address medical
malpractice claims generally, then considers the particular focus on
obstetrics.
II. GENERAL TORT REFORM AND THE "CRISIS" IN OBSTETRICS
Concern over the changes in medical malpractice since the
1970s has prompted considerable reform.7' Efforts have focused
on three areas: the insurance market, medical practice, and the
legal environment.72 Many of the reforms were responses to prob-
lems with access to medical malpractice insurance, and aimed at
making insurance more reasonably priced or more available.'
Others aimed at improving medical quality; for example, encourag-
ing peer review, increasing the disciplinary power of state medical
boards, and mandating more elaborate continuing medical educa-
tion.74 But the dominant focus of reform has been directed at ad-
dressing legal doctrine or process within the tort system. 75
Since 1970, every state but one has enacted some measure of
tort reform.76 Unlike the alternative systems under consideration,
the traditional approach to addressing problem or crisis areas in
medical liability has been limitation of the existing tort system,
rather than abandonment of the entire system for whole classes of
injured patients.77 Through the 1970s and 1980s, state legislatures
passed varying tort reform measures addressing the frequency and
severity of medical malpractice claims in general.78 While claim
71. Id. at 503.
72. See id. at 504-10 (outlining the three areas of focus for malpractice reform efforts).
73. laI at 514-19 (discussing reforms including (1) Joint Underwriting Associations, (2)
Patient Compensation Funds, (3) limiting insurance cancellations, (4) mandating liability
coverage, and (5) reporting requirements).
74. Il at 519-20.
75. Id. at 521 (discussing reforms aimed at reducing the number of lawsuits, the size
of recoveries, the costs of winning a lawsuit, and the cost to the judicial process).
76. White, supra note 14, at 1497 n.51 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDI-
CAL MALPRACTCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACiON, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS
8 (1987)). Despite the positive effects of a number of these reform efforts on the mal-
practice problem, there remains a push to make even more sweeping changes. Doctors
Bulgar and Rostow, summarizing the findings of a two-year study by a committee of the
Institute of Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, noted that tort "reforms have
not had a dramatic effect on the overall costs of the tort system . . . in resolving claims
of obstetrical malpractice." Bulger & Rostow, supra note 27, at 87. The committee also
concluded that "[d]espite ample discussion of possible alternatives [to the tort sys-
tem] .... these alternatives have not been adequately tested ... I" d.
77. White, supra note 14, at 1497.
78. See Bovbjerg, supra note 16, at 521-22, stating:
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frequency and severity continued to rise, a number of the reforms
have shown signs of effectiveness in slowing the increase.79 How-
ever, focus continues to be placed on the practice of obstetrics,'o
which is considered to be one of the high-risk specialty areas. 1
Originally, the changing atmosphere of medical malpractice
particularly impacted the practice of obstetrics." In some states,
the malpractice situation affected not only the affordability, but
also the availability of insurance coverage. 3 While other practice
areas experienced increases in the cost of insurance, the practice of
obstetrics felt both a rise in premiums and, in some areas, in-
creased difficulty in obtaining malpractice insurance regardless of
cost." The availability crisis appears to have been "adequately ad-
[O]ne can group reforms into five categories, according to apparent leg-
islative intent in enacting the provisions[:] . . . (1) the first group addresses the
number of lawsuits or insurance claims brought (insurance "frequency"); (2)
another group targets the size of recoveries ("severity" in insurance jargon); (3)
a third set addresses plaintiffs' likelihood of winning (or the costs of building
successful cases); (4) other reforms target the functioning or cost of the judicial
process; (5) finally, a miscellaneous set of largely minor reforms also exists.
79. The rise in claim frequency and severity does not indicate that reform efforts have
had no effect. Danzon notes that states with shorter statutes of limitations and outer limits
on discovery rules have had less growth in claims frequency than states more lenient to
plaintiffs, with a one year cut from a statute of limitation for adults reducing claims by
eight percent. Also, allowing offset of collateral benefits has reduced claim severity by
eleven to eighteen percent and claims frequency by fourteen percent as compared with
states without collateral source offset. Caps on damage awards, although constitutionally
challenged in some states, have reduced severity by an average of twenty-three percent.
Arbitration statutes, while causing claim frequency to increase, have reduced overall av-
erage severity with a net effect of increasing total claim costs, yet compensating more
claimants. See Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Malpractice Claims:
New Evidence, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 57, 78-79. Decreases in the
frequency and severity of claims achieved through implementation of some of these mea-
sures make the move toward alternative systems appear even more drastic. Rather than
waiting to see if reform efforts would be effective, states like Virginia and Florida re-
moved the common law cause of action completely. The "crisis" of insurance availability
is not enough to explain this, as alternative measures existed to address insurance prob-
lems.
80. See Gallup, supra note 11, at 691; White, supra note 14, at 1495.
81. See generally 1 INSTr1TU OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 92-123 (suggesting that
obstetricians' malpractice insurance premiums are higher than average physicians' because
obstetrics is a high-risk specialty).
82. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
83. Gallup, supra note 11, at 691.
84. Gallup has noted that "[d]ramatic rises in premiums and episodic refusals of insur-
ers to offer coverage constitute what is commonly referred to as a medical malpractice
crisis in obstetrics." Id.
One report indicates that average premiums paid by obstetrician-gynecologists rose
113% between 1982 and 1985, from $10,900 to $23,300 per year. See U.S. DEPARTMENT
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dressed by the creation of physician-owned insurance companies,
joint underwriting associations, and the conversion to claims-made
policies [from occurrence policies]. ' The affordability issue,
however, appears more difficult to assess; while the cost of mal-
practice coverage remains higher for obstetrics than for other low-
er-risk practice areas, obstetricians' income is also generally higher
than that of most other physicians.86
Like other practice areas, obstetrics has experienced a dramatic
increase in the frequency and severity of negligence claims.87
However, research conducted by the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Sciences found that obstetric claims are even
more numerous and more severe than claims in other specialty
areas.88 Much of the increased severity is due to birth-related neu-
rological injury claims.89 Recent legislation and reform efforts
have concentrated on this narrow category of obstetric injuries
which, occurring during the birth process and resulting in neurolog-
ical injury, account for the largest number of claims against obste-
tricians and the highest rate of damage awards.' The following
section defines the category of birth-related neurological injuries
which are the focus of the legislation and reform.
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL LIABILITY
AND MALPRACTICE 14 (1987) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. In 1982, malpractice
premiums were 10% of a typical obstetrician's average total expenses; by 1985 this figure
had climbed to 18%. For all physicians, premiums as a percent of total expenses merely
rose from 7% to 10% for the same time period. Id. at 172 (information derived from a
table contained in the TASK FORCE REPORT).
"The St. Paul's Fire & Marine Insurance Company, the largest insurer of medical
malpractice, raised the premiums of obstetricians from a national average of $12,481 in
1982 to $51,240 in 1987, an increase of 311 percent . Gallup, supra note 11, at
691.
85. 1 INSIU OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 8-9. See Bovbjerg, supra note 16, at
518 ("Traditional 'occurrence' policies pay for any claim resulting from an occurrence in
the policy year, no matter how long afterwards the claim may be brought .... By
contrast, premiums collected from 'claims-made' policies ... cover only claims made
during the policy year.").
86. See 1 INSTITUTrE OF MEDICINE, supra note 15, at 107 (171% increase in malprac-
tice premiums between 1982 and 1986 also accompanied by a 21% increase in
obstetricians' net income).
87. See Bulger & Rostow, supra note 27, at 84 (increase in severity and frequency of
claims is one principal factor in increase in obstetricians' malpractice premiums).
88. Id. ("Mhe committee noted that obstetrical claims are more numerous and more
severe than those in other specialties, and that these differences recently have been magni-
fied.").
89. See infra notes 91-99 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
CASE WESTERN RESERVE lAW REVIEW
III. BIRTH-RELATED NEUROLOGICAL IMPAIRMENT
While injuries occurring during labor and delivery make up
the largest proportion of all obstetric and gynecology verdicts,9
claims alleging birth-related neurological impairment account for
more suits against obstetricians than any other type of obstetric
injury, almost one-third of all obstetric malpractice claims.' They
also result in the largest damage awards.93
Birth-related neurological injuries impose high costs on infants,
their families, the medical profession, and society. 4 When an in-
fant is born with neurological damage that cannot be explained by
prenatal injury, drugs, infection, or trauma, the term "birth asphyx-
ia" is often used to describe the neonatal depression.95 The term
"asphyxia" implies a lack of oxygen flow to the brain with reten-
tion of carbon dioxide.' "Hypoxia [asphyxia] . . . and trauma
(mechanical injury) to fetuses and newborns during or close to
delivery can cause stillbirths and neonatal deaths [, neurological]
disabilities and malformities such as cerebral palsy, mental retarda-
tion, nerve deficits, [and] hearing and vision impairment .... "'
91. Steven Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury Decisions in Ob-
stetrics and Gynecology Cases, in 2 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL
LIABILITY AND THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 161, 175 (1989).
92. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS REPORT 1988. Gallup,
supra note 11, at 692.
93. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS REPORT 1988. See
also Gallup, supra note 11, at 692.
94. Sieradski, supra note 27, at 539.
95. Savas M. Menticoglou et al., Severe Fetal Brain Injury Without Evident Intrapar-
turn Asphyxia or Trauma, 74 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 457, 457 (1989). The term
"neonatal" refers to the period immediately before birth through the first month.
STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICnIONARY 832 (3d ed. 1972).
96. P. Agustsson & N. Patel, Intrapartum Asphyxia and Subsequent Disability, in 2
BAILLMRE'S CLINICAL OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 167, 169 (1988).
97. Sieradzki, supra note 27, at 539 (citing T. Barden, Perinatal Care, in GYNECOLO-
GY & OBSTMRICS: THE HEALTH CARE OF WOMEN 595, 647-49 (2d ed. 1981)). See also
J.A. Young, Definitions and Size of the Problem, in 2 BAILLIERE'S CLIICAL OBSTETRICS
& GYNAECOLOGY 1, 4-7 (1988) (addressing various conditions that can arise as a result
of trauma or asphyxia).
It is estimated that between 2.0 and 2.5 infants out of every 1000 live births are
born with cerebral palsy. Agustsson & Patel, supra note 96, at 169. Cerebral palsy can be
divided into three main types. First, spastic diplegia is a paralysis or lack of muscle con-
trol of corresponding parts on both sides of the body, and is commonly associated with
prematurity. A second type, spastic hemiplegia, is characterized by lack of control of one
side of the body, and is traditionally attributed to asphyxia or trauma. Finally, spastic
quadriplegia, affecting the entire body, is characterized by the most extensive neurological
damage and is most commonly accompanied by mental retardation. Infants suffering from
this last type of cerebral palsy are the ones most commonly involved in litigation. See
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Cerebral palsy and mental retardation constitute the most prevalent
forms of neurological impairment, with some degree of overlap. 98
Medical treatment is expensive, and while many injured infants die
at an early age, others need long-term care and assistance.99
While recent studies indicate that perinatal asphyxia may not
be the cause of as many neurological injuries as previously as-
sumed,"t° the studies nonetheless continue to demonstrate a sig-
nificant association between severe asphyxia occurring during labor
and delivery and resulting severe neurological impairment. 1 In
Perkins, supra note 12, at 808-09.
Paneth and Stark, in an epidemiologic review, found that severe mental retardation is
most likely caused by a biological insult to the brain, 8 to 10 percent of which they
estimated to occur through perinatal asphyxia. Nigel Paneth & Raymond I. Stark, Cerebral
Palsy and Mental Retardation in Relation to Indicators of Perinatal Asphyxia, 147 AM. L
OBST. GYNEOL. 960, 961 (1983).
98. "About 50% of children with cerebral palsy have IQ's within the normal range; of
the remainder, about one half are severely retarded, and 10 to 20% of the severely retard-
ed have cerebral palsy." Paneth & Stark, supra note 97, at 962.
99. Retarded children with birth injuries usually require institutional care by the age of
seven, and frequently die at an early age (50% within six years of institutionalization, and
74% by the age of 20). Robert H. Chancy et al., Birth Injury as the Cause of Mental
Retardation, 67 OBsEMCS & GYNECOLOGY 771, 773 (1986).
100. Some medical researchers argue that many neurological injuries actually occur dur-
ing pregnancy rather than as a result of asphyxia and poor obstetrical care during deliv-
ery. Paneth and Stark note:
iThere is little consensus as to how much of the burden of neurologic hand-
icap in the community is attributable to intraparturn and neonatal asphyxia, as
measured clinically. A review of the available epidemiologic information sug-
gests that the role of perinatal events in the genesis of more severe mental
retardation and cerebral palsy is not as large as popularly thought. Of all neu-
rologic handicaps, cerebral palsy bears the closest relationship to adverse perina-
tal events, but at least 50% of all cases have no documented depression at the
time of birth. No more than 15% of severe mental retardation can be attributed
to perinatal events. Severe mental retardation without cerebral palsy does not
appear to be attributable to birth asphyxia.
Paneth & Stark, supra note 97, at 960.
The relationship between fetal asphyxia and long-term central nervous system impair-
ment has become one of the most controversial issues in obstetrics. C. Amiel-Tison et al.,
Cerebral Handicap in Full-Term Neonates Related to the Mechanical Forces of Labour, in
2 BAI.LIERs' CLINICAL OBSrmff cs & GYNAECOLOGY 145, 145 (1988). This is perhaps
a response to increased physician liability. Researchers have considered other possible
causes of neurological impairment in infants, spanning from genetic and environmental
causes to maternal or neonatal hazards. See Eva Alberman, Epidemiology and Causative
Factors, in 2 BAmiL.ERE'S CLINCAL OBsTmTRCs & GYNAECOLOGY 9, 9-14 (1988) (outlin-
ing various causes of neurological impairments).
101. A significantly high risk of cerebral palsy due to severe birth asphyxia has been
demonstrated. See Alberman, supra note 100, at 17-18. See also Paneth & Stark, supra
note 97, at 962 ("A strong relationship between . . .birth asphyxia and cerebral palsy
has been demonstrated ..."')
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the event of severe neurological injury, the resulting impairment
can sometimes be attributed to poor obstetrical care during deliv-
ery, with the mismanagement causing "birth asphyxia."' 2 While a
percentage of neurological injuries caused by maternal drug use can
mask as being the result of asphyxia, 3 there is evidence that a
substantial percentage of injury is the result of oxygen deprivation
and mechanical injury during labor, caused by negligent obstetric
treatment. The injuries occurring in Anderson and Boyd are exam-
ples of such treatment. Further, tort liability is not being imposed
over incorrect use or failure to use new advanced technologies, but
over failure to adequately follow established procedures and tech-
niques,"°4 suggesting that rather than liability being imposed over
failure to use new techniques or "defensive" measures, it is in
response to a lack of tolerance for failure to follow established
In another recent study, of 142 cases reviewed, the causes of cerebral palsy were
prenatal in 50% of the cases, perinatal in 33%, postnatal in 10%, and mixed in the re-
maining 7%. Vanja A. Holm, The Causes of Cerebral Palsy: A Contemporary Perspective,
247 JAMA 1473, 1474 (1982). The researchers estimated that as much as 10 percent of
cerebral palsy occurrence might be preventable through use of measures designed to avoid
asphyxia. See id. at 1477. In addition, it is generally recognized that severe mental retar-
dation is caused by perinatal asphyxia between 10 and 15% of the time. See Paneth &
Stark, supra note 97, at 960.
The results of studies showing a strong relationship between birth asphyxia and
neurologic injury can be reconciled with studies minimizing this relationship in that it
appears that even those who argue against asphyxia as the major cause of neurologic in-
jury admit that it is a cause in a significant percentage of cases. This figure is approxi-
mately ten percent where asphyxia is the sole cause of injury without alternative explana-
tions. See Chaney et al., supra note 99, at 771 (indicating that, despite a showing that
perinatal asphyxia was not as significant a causative factor in mental retardation cases as
previously thought, perinatal injuries still caused 10% of mental retardation. The distin-
guishing factor seems to be that severe asphyxia is a cause of similarly severe neurologi-
cal impairment, or the more severe cases of cerebral palsy and mental retardation. Pre-
sumably, these severe injuries are the ones most likely to receive compensation through
the tort system.
102. See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 12, at 807. See also Amiel-Tison et al., supra note
100, at 145. The authors note that "[s]ome investigators believe that there is a direct rela-
tionship between intrapartum fetal asphyxia and [central nervous system] injury while
others reject this hypothesis as having little scientific foundation." Id. In summarizing
laboratory data and clinical observations relating the mechanical stress of labor to its con-
sequences, the authors go on to argue that both hypotheses are untenable, concluding in-
stead that CNS injury is a response to three factors: 1) the duration and severity of as-
phyxia, 2) the ability of a given fetus to tolerate stress, and 3) the circumstances under
which stress occurs (for example the impact of mechanical forces on the fetus' head). Id.
103. See Epstein, supra note 66, at 1469 (discussing the high incidence of maternal
drug use, noting that under a standard of negligent liability it is highly unlikely that any
of these injuries would create a "colorable case for liability," while under alternative sys-
tems like no-fault, all of them do).
104. Daniels & Andrews, supra note 91, at 189.
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procedures, particularly when severe injuries result. Generally,
successful obstetric malpractice claims arising out of labor and
delivery involve these severe injuries."°5 Although tort reform ef-
forts were previously aimed at addressing the medical malpractice
climate generally, more recent efforts have focused on this narrow
category of severe injuries, even though these injuries are highly
correlated with obstetricians' negligence and result in irreparable
damage to affected infants. While plaintiffs in these cases appear to
be the most deserving of greater protection, the alternative systems
seriously restrict the rights and protections of injured infants. The
following section outlines the structure of these alternative systems.
IV. INTRODUCION OF ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS UNDER
CONSIDERATION
A. The Limited No-Fault Statutes
Although prior reform measures made dramatic changes in the
tort system, "they did not alter its fundamental premise that com-
pensation should be based on a finding of fault on the part of the
provider.""I°s More recent reform efforts, however, have advocated
abandoning both the tort system and the premise of liability based
on fault. The first two systems to be considered, no-fault statutes
and selective no-fault systems, are examples of this trend. The
basic premise of "no-fault" is that injured parties can seek compen-
sation for their injuries without having to prove that the injury is a
result of negligence. "No-fault" proponents have suggested the re-
placement of the tort malpractice claim with such a system where
victims of medical injury are compensated irrespective of a show-
ing of fault on the part of the physician. Obstetrics is the first
medical area where no-fault has been statutorily adopted. Shortly
after a district court declared Virginia's $1 million cap on damages
unconstitutional and upheld an $8.3 million damage award in
Boyd,17 Virginia's largest medical malpractice insurer threatened
105. See iL at 177 ("Generally, the injuries in obstetrics and gynecology cases were
likely to be more rather than less severe. About 60 percent of the cases involved a per-
manent injury or death . . . ").
106. White, supra note 14, at 1497.
107. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789 (W.D. Va. 1986) (damage cap infringed
state and federal constitutional right to jury trial), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 905
F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1990) (damage cap constitutional), certifying questions to Bulala v.
Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990) (answering questions of statutory construction and Vir-
ginia common law), confonned to answers of certified questions, 905 F.2d 764 (4th Cir.
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to drop coverage of many of the state's obstetricians.' 8 In re-
sponse, the Virginia legislature passed the first no-fault medical
injury statute, removing the right to a tort claim for victims of
birth-related neurological injuries."° One year later, Florida fol-
lowed suit, enacting the Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan."0 Other states are currently considering en-
actment of similar statutes."'
1. The Virginia Birth Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Act
By 1986, the medical malpractice insurance market had left
140 of Virginia's 600 obstetricians uninsured."' Following the
ruling in Boyd, PHICO, Virginia's principle insurer, withdrew from
the market, and two other insurers restricted coverage on new
obstetricians and refused to cover the obstetricians previously cov-
ered by PHICO."' The insurers stated that the only way they
would be induced back into the system would be through legisla-
tive removal of the worst obstetric cases from the insurers' expo-
sure.1' 4 The Virginia legislature responded by enacting the Vir-
ginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act.". "By
1990).
108. Gallup, supra note 11, at 691-92.
109. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990); infra notes 112-41
and accompanying text.
110. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301-.316 (West 1992). See infra notes 142-59 and accom-
panying text.
I11. See supra note 18.
112. Gallup, supra note 11, at 691.
113. Id. at 691-92. Gallup states:
After a federal district court declared Virginia's $1 million cap on damages
unconstitutional and upheld an award of $8.3 million to an infant judged to
have been negligently harmed by an obstetrician, one of the principal carriers
in Virginia, the Pennsylvania Hospital Insurance Company (PHICO), withdrew
from the market. The other two carriers writing obstetrical malpractice insurance
in Virginia, St. Paul's and the Virginia Insurance Reciprocal Company, had
previously restricted coverage of new obstetricians and refused to insure the
obstetricians abandoned by PHICO. Approximately 25 percent of the state's
obstetricians could not obtain insurance at any price.
Id.
114. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Pragmatic Constraints on Market Approaches: A Response
to Professor Epstein, 74 VA. L. REV. 1475, 1478 (1988) ("Dispositive of the ... de-
cision to back the [Virginia Act] was an opinion from one of the state's principal medical
malpractice insurer [sic], the Virginia Insurance Reciprocal, that only a bill removing the
worst obstetrical cases from the insurer's exposure would induce the insurer to cover
obstetric risks.").
115. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000 to -5021 (Michie 1990).
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compensating these children on a no-fault basis and removing them
from the tort system, Virginia's legislators [hoped] both to lower
malpractice costs and to increase their predictability, thus making
the obstetrical malpractice market more attractive to insurers." ' 6
The Act, effective as of January 1, 1988, was the first reform ef-
fort to adopt no-fault compensation for medical liability. 7
The Virginia Act is a limited no-fault system since it targets
only a select group of birth-related injuries and removes these
specific classes of injuries from the tort system."' The Act is re-
stricted to a limited class of injuries, stating:
"Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the
brain or spinal cord of an infant caused by the deprivation
of oxygen or mechanical injury occurring in the course of
labor, delivery or resuscitation in the immediate post-deliv-
ery period in a hospital which renders the infant perma-
nently motorically disabled and (i) developmentally disabled
or (ii) for infants sufficiently developed to be cognitively
evaluated, cognitively disabled. In order to constitute a
"birth-related neurological injury" within the meaning of
this chapter, such disability shall cause the infant to be
permanently in need of assistance in all activities of daily
living.
119
The Act further specifies that the definition applies to live birth
only and "[does] not include disability or death caused by genetic
or congenital abnormality, degenerative neurological disease, or
maternal substance abuse.' 'I2°
The Virginia Act provides for claims to be filed with, and
heard by, the State Industrial Commission, which also hears
workers' compensation claims.' A claimant can file a petition
with the Commission setting forth all information relevant to the
claim.1" The Board of Medicine evaluates the petition and "if it
116. Gallup, supra note 11, at 693-94.
117. Id. at 692 (discussing Virginia as a leader for other states attempting to reduce
costs of birth-related neurological injuries).
118. Id. ("[Tihis act provides reimbursement for a highly limited category of neurologi-
cally impaired children without regard to the fault of the provider. In turn, the law pro-
hibits children or their families from pursuing recovery for their injuries through the tort
system."). All other obstetric injuries not falling within these specific groups would have
access to the tort system.
119. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5001 (Michie 1990).
120. Id.
121. Id. §§ 38.2-5003 to -5004.
122. Id § 38.2-5004 (requiring petitions to include "[a] brief statement of the facts and
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determines that there is reason to believe that the alleged injury
resulted from, or was aggravated by, substandard care on the part
of the physician, it shall take any appropriate action consistent with
the authority granted to the Board .... ""
The Virginia Act provides the exclusive remedy for the injured
infant."u However, a civil action against a non-participating phy-
sician or hospital is available provided that no participating
physician"as or hospital" is made a party to the action." The
Act contains no provision requiring a participating physician or
hospital to notify the patient of participation in this no-fault system
prior to treatment.128
The Act provides for interrogatories and depositions'29 and a
hearing between 45 and 120 days after the filing of the petition,
with the claimant and the Program as required parties to the hear-
ing."' Most notably, the obstetrician is absent from the list of
parties to the hearing. While arguably the obstetrician would still
be required at the hearing to give information about the services
delivered, his or her participation is considerably less than that
required by the tort system.' The deans of the medical schools
of the Virginia Commonwealth are called on to "develop a plan
whereby each claim filed with the Commission is reviewed by a
panel of three qualified and impartial physicians [which] shall file
[a] report and recommendations as to whether the injury alleged is
a birth-related neurological injury ....
circumstances surrounding the birth-related neurological injury and giving rise to the
claim .... ").
123. Id. § 38.2-5004(2)(B).
124. Id. § 38.2-5001(B). However, a civil action is not foreclosed against a physician or
hospital if there is clear and convincing evidence that the injury was intentionally or
willfully caused, provided that such suit is filed prior to and in lieu of an award under
the Act. Id § 38.2-5001(C).
125. A physician may become a participating physician by paying an annual assessment
to the Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Program of $5000 a year.
Id § 38.2-5020(A).
126. A hospital may become a participating hospital for a particular year by paying an
annual participating hospital assessment of $50 per live birth for the previous year. Id §
38.2-5020(C).
127. Id § 38.2-5020(D).
128. See id. § 38.2-5020(c) to (d) (listing requirements for a participating hospital or
physician, but failing to include a requirement to disclose participatory status).
129. Id. § 38.2-5007.
130. Id § 38.2-5006.
131. This removes the deterrent effect of participation in the adjudication process. See
infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text.
132. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5008(B). The Act also contains a rebuttable presumption
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Like Virginia's workers' compensation statute,133 the Virginia
Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Act compensates
for "[a]ctual medically necessary and reasonable expenses,""
limited compensation for loss of earnings, 135  and reasonable ex-
penses incurred in filing the claim, including reasonable attorneys'
fees. 3  Compensation through the Act is offset by any collateral
sources such as private insurance.137 While the alternative systems
discussed below have the possibility of a discretionary award for
noncompensatory damages, the Virginia statute does not compen-
sate for pain and suffering, or any other noneconomic losses.'
The program is funded by assessments against obstetricians, hospi-
tals, and all physicians.'39
As noted previously, there is no requirement under the Virginia
Act that either participating obstetricians or hospitals notify patients
of participation in the plan,"' even though provider participation
effectively bars patients from the right to file a tort claim. 4'
that the injury is a "birth-related neurological injury" where it has been demonstrated that
the infant has sustained an injury defined within the act. Id. § 38.2-5008(A)(1). For the
text of the statute defining "birth-related neurological injury," see supra text accompanying
notes 119-20.
133. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-500 to -531 (Michie 1992) (compensation provisions of
Virginia Workers' Compensation statute).
134. Id. § 38.2-5009(1). This calculation of expenses does not include those expenses
reimbursed by another source such as government assistance, prepaid health plans or other
private insurance. Id. § 38.2-5009(l)(a) to (d).
135. A conclusive presumption allows an infant sustaining birth-related neurological
injuries to receive fifty percent of the average weekly wage of private, nonfarm workers
for the period between ages eighteen and sixty-five. Id. § 38.2-5009(3).
136. Id. § 38.2-5009(4).
137. See supra note 134.
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009 (listing the types of losses for which compensation is
allowed under the statute).
139. Id. § 38.2-5020. Constitutionality of this type of funding has been challenged in
Florida by physicians who did not provide obstetric services. A Florida court upheld the
funding scheme because the program's funding was not based on an arbitrary or discrimi-
natory classification and therefore did not violate due process or raise equal protection
concerns. See McGibony v. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation, 564 So. 2d
177, 178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cause dismissed, 576 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 194 (1992).
140. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
141. See Epstein, supra note 66, at 1473. Epstein opposes this lack of consumer notice,
pointing out that in failing to require disclosure, the Act fails to force each physician to
evaluate the effect of his or her decision to join the Program on his or her medical prac-
tice. Id.
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2. The Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury
Compensation Plan
Exactly one year after the Virginia Act went into effect, Flori-
da enacted a similar system, titled the Florida Birth-Related Neuro-
logical Injury Compensation Plan. 4 1 Modeled after the Virginia
Act, the stated purpose of the Florida Plan is to "provid[e] com-
pensation, irrespective of fault, for birth-related neurological injury
claims."' 43 However, the legislative findings suggest that the pri-
mary motivation for the Act was to decrease malpractice premiums
for obstetricians more so than to provide compensation to severely
injured infants. t4 Florida's act differs from Virginia's in several
respects. First, Florida's statute assesses a tax against all licensed
physicians and hospitals, 45 whereas Virginia's program permits
hospitals to choose whether or not to participate.'" Second, un-
like the Virginia Act, the Florida Plan provides for notice to ob-
stetrical patients by hospitals and physicians participating in the
limited no-fault alternative.47 The Florida Plan contains a provi-
sion for $100,000 in damages to the parents. 48 In addition, while
the Virginia plan provides for a three member medical advisory
panel, the Florida plan specifically provides for the makeup of the
panel.49 Each claim is reviewed by the medical advisory panel
142. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.301-316 (West 1992).
143. Id. § 766.303. The statute states:
"Birth-related neurological injury" means injury to the brain or spinal cord of a
live infant weighing at least 2,500 grams at birth caused by oxygen deprivation
or mechanical injury occurring in the course of labor, delivery, or resuscitation
in the immediate post-delivery period in a hospital, which renders the infant
permanently and substantially mental and physically impaired. This definition
shall apply to live births only and shall not include disability or death caused
by genetic or congenital abnormality.
Id. § 766.302(2).
144. Section 766.301 states the legislative findings and intent, in part, as:
(a) Physicians practicing obstetrics are high-risk medical specialists for whom
malpractice insurance premiums are very costly, and recent increases in such
premiums have been greater for such physicians than for other physicians.
(b) Any birth other than a normal birth frequently leads to a claim against the
attending physician; consequently, such physicians are among the physicians
most severely affected by current medical malpractice problems.
L
145. Id. § 766.314(4)(a)-(b).
146. See supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
147. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.316.
148. Id. § 766.31(1)(b). For a more complete discussion of the compensation available
under the Florida Plan, see infra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
149. Id. § 766.308. The Florida statute also specifically provides for the makeup of the
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made up of three physicians appointed by the Division of Workers'
Compensation; the panel includes one pediatric neurologist or neu-
rosurgeon, one obstetrician, and one neonatologist or pediatri-
cian."' The medical advisory panel files a report recommending
whether the injury alleged in the claim is a birth-related neurologi-
cal injury.' The Plan provides for claims to be determined by
the judge of compensation claims of the Division of Workers'
Compensation,' in a hearing occurring between 60 and 120 days
after the filing of a petition by the claimant.
53
The Plan compensates "[a]ctual expenses for medically neces-
sary and reasonable medical ... expenses,"''" reasonable expens-
es incurred in filing a claim, including reasonable attorneys'
fees,'55 and periodic payments of an award not to exceed
$100,000 to the parents or legal guardians of an infant found to
have sustained a compensable injury.' Yet the Act does not
guarantee the amount of the periodic payment, or state what the
payment replaces."s The Florida Plan limits the filing of claims
to seven years after the birth of the infant.'
Finally, when the Florida Plan went into effect, it became the
exclusive remedy for an infant with a "birth-related neurological
injury.
Florida Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation Association, a board of five direc-
tors which oversees the Plan. Section 766.315 provides that the board shall consist of one
citizen representative and one representative each from participating physicians, hospitals,
casualty insurers, and non-participating physicians. Id. § 766.315(1)(c).
150. Id. § 766.308(1).
151. Id. While the panel may be highly educated on neurological injuries in obstetrics,
its member may be biased in favor of obstetricians and against individuals claiming com-
pensable injuries under the Plan, maling a compensable claim more difficult to obtain for
the injured infant. For discussion of the potential anti-claimant bias of medical disciplinary
boards and associations like those provided for in the Florida and Virginia statutes, see
infra notes 239-43 and accompanying text.
152. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.304.
153. Id. § 766.307(1). Like the Virginia Act, under the Florida Plan the parties to the
hearing include the claimant and the association which administers the plan, with no refer-
ence to the physician being present. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
154. Id. § 766.31(I)(a) (also noting that these expenses do not include payments from
the federal government, private insurance companies, or prepaid health plans).
155. Id. § 766.31(1)(c) (listing time, labor, difficulty, length of the professional relation-
ship, and experience of the lawyer as factors considered in determining the award).
156. Id. § 766.31(1)(b). At the discretion of the judge of compensation, this award can
be given in a lump sum. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. § 766.313.
159. Id. § 766.303(2) (only allowing a civil action where clear and convincing evidence
of bad faith, malicious purpose, or willful conduct is established).
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
B. Selective No-Fault Accelerated Compensation Event System
The Accelerated Compensation Event ("ACE") System is a pro-
posed alternative insurance system aimed at removing the most
severe obstetric injuries from litigation, by locating "classes of
medical injuries determined in advance by medical experts to be
readily identifiable, normally preventable with good care, and
nondistorting of medical decision-making. '' "W The system propos-
es to remove these classes of obstetric injuries from malpractice
litigation and instead provide private or social insurance to cover
predefined accelerated-compensation events.' 6'
ACE systems cover adverse outcomes determined by medical
experts to be (1) relatively avoidable, (2) easily identifiable,
and (3) unlikely to cause distortions in medical decision-making re-
garding treatment. 6" A group of obstetric specialists, reviewing
data from insurance claims and adverse hospital outcomes, created
a list of forty-eight types of injuries, in eleven categories, which
qualify as obstetrical ACEs1e
The authors of the ACE system proposal distinguish it from
"no-fault" based on the system's reliance on statistical preventabili-
ty, as ACEs are categories of injuries deemed to be statistically
preventable with good care,"es making ACEs "akin to fault."'
7
Therefore, the system is termed "selective no-fault," as "ACEs
cover only those medical injuries selected for coverage by profes-
sional judgment."'" However, the ACE system proponents limit
160. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 2836. Similar to the no-fault statutes, injuries
not included within the classification of compensable injuries would presumably be able to
file a claim for negligence in the tort system. Id. at 2861.
161. Id. Prior writings on this proposal characterized ACEs as "designated compensable
events." However, the authors of this current proposal felt this "emphasized the intentional
nature of constructing a listing," and chose instead to emphasize what they perceived to
be the major benefit of ACEs, accelerated compensation. Id. at 2837.
162. Avoidability means the use of methods of diagnosis and treatment that could pre-
vent the injury and recognizes the capability of timely intervention upon recognition of a
bad outcome to mitigate its long-term effects. Id. at 2836.
163. The objective of identifiability is to ensure that only avoidable events are included.
Id.
164. The purpose of this criterion is to avoid distortions in medical decisionmaking,
whereby a physician would elect a less than optimal treatment modality because it would
be unlikely to result in an ACE. Id
165. Id at 2836-37 (including, for. example, nerve injuries, puncture or laceration
wounds, and failure to diagnose).
166. Id. ("ACEs have to be injuries that are preventable in a specified share of cases
receiving good care.").
167. Id. at 2837.
168. Id. (finding that the ACE system falls somewhere between "no-fault" and fault-
1322 [Vol. 43:1299
BAD CURES FOR BAD BABIES
this association with fault, as the system is designed to avoid indi-
vidualized fault-finding."a
Accelerated-compensation events would be compensated by the
responsible insurer without legal proceedings.17° Damages would
include actual pecuniary loss and some allowances for nonpecuni-
ary damages, according to preset qualitative standards, possibly
"scheduled on the basis of severity and duration of injury,''
with periodic payments of future losses."n Currently no state has
adopted an ACE system, although the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academy of Sciences has proposed it as a method for
states to consider.7 3
C. The Fault-Based Alternative: The AMA-Specialty Society's
Fault-Based Administrative System
The AMA-Specialty Society Fault-Based Administrative Sys-
tem 74 is both a rejection of the tort system as well as a response
to the "no-fault" and "selective no-fault" systems. Member-societies
believed that tort reform efforts were incomplete solutions to an
inherently flawed system and although a radical alternative was
called for, systems removing the fault inquiry were not the an-
swer."'75 Society members were concerned with the unknown po-
tential costs of a no-fault system, the effect on deterrence, and the
fairness of holding physicians responsible for injuries that may be
a natural consequence of nonnegligent treatment or disease. 76
The AMA-Specialty Society, comprised of the American Medi-
cal Association ("AMA") and 31 national medical specialty societ-
ies, including the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists ("ACOG"), have proposed that a state administrative
agency1" have power both to resolve medical liability disputes
based systems).
169. Id. at 2841.
170. Id. at 2837 (noting that this type of administration resembles health or disability
insurance rather than liability insurance).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2842.
173. See Bulger & Rostow, supra note 27, at 88 (recommending the American Medical
Association's no-fault scheme, private contracts, and ACE systems as alternatives to the
tort system).
174. AMA PROPOSAL, supra note 26.
175. See id. supra note 26, at 12-16 (asserting that "no-faut' systems remove deter-
rence, increase costs, and are not suited to the problems of medical liability).
176. Id. at 14.
177. The administrative agency would be a modification of the existing state medical
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and to discipline doctors.' "The proposal calls for a fault-based
administrative system, under the jurisdiction of strengthened state
medical boards or a new state agency, which would totally replace
the existing court/jury system."'79 Proponents hope that the sys-
tem will be adopted in one or more states, with obstetrics as an
initial area for implementation. 80
"The proposed system has three basic parts: (1) a claims reso-
lution function,' (2) a credentialling and disciplinary process,"
and (3) a codification of the legal elements of medical liabili-
ty.1 83 In contrast to the prevailing system of decision through the
civil jury system, all three components would be administered by
the revamped state medical board, which would be vested with the
additional authority to review and decide medical liability
claims." The proposal recommends a seven member Medical
Board, with a requirement of at least two physicians and one
health care professional on the Board.' 5 But no more than three
health care practitioners would be permitted to serve on the Board
at the same time.'86
Under the claims resolution function, a medical malpractice
complaint would be presented to the administrative agency for an
initial screening."n The proposal suggests that most claims would
disciplinary board or a newly created administrative agency, which could also be labeled a
medical board. Id. at 17.
178. Id.
179. AMA-Specialty Society Medical Liability Project, Press Release, Medical Groups
Offer Proposal to Resolve Malpractice Crisis 2 (1988) [hereinafter Press Release].
180. See, e.g., Carter G. Phillips & Elizabeth H. Esty, A Fault-Based Adininistrative
Alternative for Resolving Medical Malpractice Claims: The AMA-Specialty Society Medical
Liability Projects' Proposal and Its Relevance to the Crisis in Obstetrics, in 2 MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LudunrrY AND ThE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 136, 149 (1989).
181. The system uses an expert administrative agency instead of the court system to
determine cases in hopes of dismissing most claims at this stage. Press Release, supra
note 179, at 2.
182. The purpose behind this feature is to strengthen the administrative agency's ability
to oversee physicians, and thus, its authority to implement disciplinary practices. Id. at 2-
3.
183. Id. at 2.
184. Id. Alternatively, states could create a separate agency to serve this claim resolu-
tion function. Id.
185. See AMA PROPOSAL, supra note 26, at 67-71 (not requiring the remaining five
members to meet any specific criteria).
186. Id. (noting that the plaintiffs' bar would withdraw support for the Board if physi-
cians were permitted to form a majority).
187. Press Release, supra note 179, at 2.
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be dismissed or settled at this initial review." Throughout the
process, the claimant has the option of free representation by attor-
neys from the agency's office of general counsel, while the physi-
cian would be represented by private counsel."8 9 A hearing would
be conducted on all unsettled claims before a hearing examiner."9
Unlike the "no-fault" and "selective no-fault" systems, the physi-
cian would be a necessary party to the hearings.'9'
This system also proposes credentialling and disciplinary func-
tions, relying heavily on a revamped State Medical Board."9
First, all settlements and awards would be reported to an investiga-
tive branch of the agency for screening to determine if a pattern of
substandard care exists. 93 Physician performance credentialling
would be conducted periodically with substandard overall perfor-
mance reported to the Board."9 Insurers would be required to re-
port insurance cancellations and failure to renew if related to com-
petence. This information would be maintained in a clearing-
house. 95 Disciplinary procedures would be implemented by the
state board."9 The system also proposes changes in the standard
of care rules, while maintaining negligence as the principle for
decisionmaking.s 7
The AMA plan proposes scheduled compensation for economic
damages determined by the agency's board, plus the possibility of
recovering non-economic damages, determined at the discretion of
the hearing examiner.98
While addressing the issue of fault differently, the alternative
systems outlined above share certain similarities. All remove claims
from the jury process."9 All but the AMA proposal remove any
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See AMA PROPOSAL, supra note 26, at 21. See supra notes 130-31, 153 and ac-
companying text.
192. Press Release, supra note 179, at 2.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. AMA PROPOSAL, supra note 26, at 60.
197. Id. at 90-101 (asserting that the customary standard of care, whereby similar physi-
cians in similar situations provide the standard of care, should be replaced because (1)
physicians are reluctant to testify against each other, (2) certain geographic areas maintain
too low of a standard of care, and (3) the current system serves to perpetuate the practice
of defensive medicine).
198. Id. at 144-52 (consolidating all types of non-economic damages into one category
and placing a cap on the maximum award allowed).
199. See supra notes 118-20, 143 and accompanying text (Florida's and Virginia's statu-
13251993]
1326 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1299
fault inquiry.'t Each compensates for economic damages through
scheduled payments."0 All but the Virginia act contemplate the
possibility of limited noneconomic damages,' and the inclusion
of or the amount of such noncompensatory damages is discretion-
ary.23 The systems rely largely on medical panels both to deter-
mine compensable claims and to provide limited deterrence,'
with no other deterrent mechanisms outlined in the systems.
The following section will analyze the alternative systems fur-
ther in terms of addressing the fault and causation standards and
objectives of the tort system of compensating and deterring negli-
gence. First, however, the justifications for exclusive treatment of
birth-related neurological injuries is questioned.
V. EVALUATION OF SELECrrIVE TREATMENT FOR BIRTH-RELATED
NEUROLOGICAL INJURIES: WITHSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL AND
POLICY CHALLENGES
It is likely that the statutory restrictions on the rights of vic-
tims of birth-related neurological injuries will withstand constitu-
tional challenges.' The funding tax on nonparticipating physi-
cians has already been upheld against a challenge on due process
and equal protection grounds.' 6 A potential plaintiff is unlikely to
be successful in an equal protection challenge because a rational
tory removal of certain injuries from the tort system) and supra notes 160-68 and accom-
panying text (discussing ACE system's removal of certain classes of medical injuries from
the tort system).
200. ACEs, however, predetermine fault in deciding categories of compensable events,
but remove the individual finding of fault at the time a claim is filed. See supra notes
165-69 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 133-38, 154-57, 170-72, 198 and accompanying text (discussing
the provisions of the Virginia, Florida, ACE, and AMA plans that allow recovery for
economic damages).
202. See supra text accompanying note 138.
203. See supra notes 156, 171 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 132, 149-51, 165, 178 and accompanying text (discussing the role
of medical boards in each system).
205. See White. supra note 14, at 1504 (outlining the 3 types of constitutional chal-
lenges that these statutes are likely to receive and to withstand, including the right to trial
by jury, equal protection, and the right to due process of law). But see Ward, supra note
30, at 436-50 (arguing that the Virginia Act is unconstitutional because it discriminates
against the class of children who suffer serious neurological injuries).
206. See McGibony v. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Compensation, 564 So. 2d 177,
179 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cause dismissed, 576 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 194 (1992) (upholding the constitutionality of the funding mechanism of the Florida
plan).
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basis standard is usually adopted in these challenges.' Where a
medical malpractice crisis exists, a valid legislative purpose may be
found.s The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that commonlaw
rights can be legislatively altered without violating due process'
where the new arrangement is not arbitrary or unreasonable.210
Because vocal insurer and physician interest groups advocate that
the current medical malpractice climate in obstetrics is in a state of
crisis, and that birth-related neurological injury claims are a sub-
stantial cause of this crisis,"' statutory restrictions like no-fault
and the alternative systems are likely to continue to receive legisla-
tive support.
While arguably constitutionally permissible, legislatior that
abrogates the rights of an underrepresented class of victims1 of
birth-related neurological injuries is insupportable on policy
grounds. Analysis of the current malpractice situation in obstetrics
demonstrates that removal of the common law right to bring these
claims is arbitrary and unreasonable, as these claims are neither the
207. See White, supra note 14, at 1509-10 (asserting these infants have no fundamental
right to sue and the category composed of the most severely injured infants is not a
suspect class).
208. See ki at 1510 (asserting that stabilizing the insurance market is a valid legislative
objective). However, the Rhode Island Supreme Court has found that, absent a medical
malpractice crisis, a system providing unequal and separate treatment of medical malprac-
tice litigants violates the equal protection clause. Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 93
(R.I. 1983). The Court stated:
Mhe Fourteenth Amendment permits states a wide scope of discretion in enact-
ing laws that affect some classes of citizens differently from others. The critical
question is whether there exists an appropriate governmental interest suitably
furthered by the differential treatment. Both the nature of the classification and
the individual rights upon which it may infringe must be scrutinized to deter-
mine legislative compliance with equal-protection standards. (citations omitted).
Id. at 91.
209. See Ward, supra note 30, at 438; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) ("A
person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law.").
210. See Ward, supra note 30, at 438-39 (discussing New York Cent. R.R. v. White,
243 U.S. 188, 202 (1917), which requires the due process analysis to consider "whether
the new arrangement is arbitrary and unreasonable, from the standpoint of natural jus-
tice:').
211. See supra notes 82-93 and accompanying text.
212. At the same time that potential plaintiffs were largely unrepresented in consider-
ation of the Virginia Act, physician and insurance groups participated in its implementa-
tion. See Ward, supra note 30, at 444 n.85, where the author comments on the relative
political powerlessness of this small class of children in light of the enactment of the
Virginia Act: "When the Act was passed the affected children were unborn. In addition,
most people do not consider the possibility of having a catastrophically injured child.
Therefore, no one was in a position to take a personal stand against the Act when it was
proposed."
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cause of the "crisis" - if in fact a crisis exists2 13 - nor the so-
lution. Further, statutory restrictions will have an adverse impact on
the rights of the most severely injured infants, arguably the catego-
ry most in need of protection.
A. Justifications for Selective Treatment of Birth Injury Claims:
Analysis and Criticism
Claims of a medical malpractice crisis in obstetrics requiring
alternative treatment rest on a number of largely unsupported asser-
tions about the effectiveness of the tort system: 1) that there is an
increase in the frequency and severity of claims which is affecting
both the cost and availability of insurance;214 2) that juries are
incapable of fairly determining an obstetric injury claim and, as a
result, verdicts are arbitrary, excessive, and based on jury sympa-
thy;215 and 3) that treatment is being adversely driven by the
threat of liability through "defensive medicine," raising the cost of
treatment. 6 While these assertions were initially made with little
reliance on statistical data, recent evidence suggests they are un-
founded.
1. Responding to the Frequency and Severity of Claims
Proponents of the alternative systems argue that the malpractice
experience in obstetrics has been more dramatic than in other prac-
217tice areas, yet many of these assertions are based on compari-
sons of obstetrics with general practice and historically lower risk
practices. 8 When the obstetric situation is compared with other
high risk specialty areas, it is not significantly different in terms of
the frequency of plaintiffs bringing claims219 from medical spe-
213. See Elliot Martin Blake, Rumors of Crisis: Considering the Insurance Crisis and
Tort Reform in an Information Vacuum, 37 EMORY U. 401, 402 (1988) (finding the
premise that a liability crisis exists difficult to prove because of the limited amount of
supporting evidence available); supra note 68 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 217-28 and accompanying text.
215. See infra notes 229-43 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 82-93, 112-14 and accompanying text; see also Bulger & Rostow,
supra note 27, at 84 (noting that obstetric claims are more numerous and severe than
claims in other specialty areas).
218. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
219. See generally Daniels & Andrews, supra note 91. The authors compare obstetric
claims with the claims experiences of other high-risk specialty areas and note that a small
percentage of injury-causing medical errors lead to claims against physicians. While
Daniels and Andrews found obstetric claims were more frequently brought, this increased
frequency was considerably less dramatic when compared with other high-risk areas. Fur-
1328 [Vol. 43:1299
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cialties where similar treatment has been rejected.' The past
twenty years have also seen a significant rise in litigation
generally. 22
Further, underlying the increase in frequency is evidence that
rather than a surge in nonmeritorious claims, even more negligence
is occurring than claims are being filed.m This evidence strongly
suggests that the focus should not be placed on reducing the fre-
quency of claims by shrinking the categories of compensable
claims. Such measures will limit legitimate plaintiffs' abilities to
bring claims at the risk of decreased deterrence. Moreover, birth-re-
lated neurological injuries are more expensive than other claims.
Successful cases involve severe injury, with costly medical care
and calculations of lost future earnings based on the normal life
expectancy of an infant.m In addition, the severity of obstetric
claims is alleged to have caused an increase in the cost of insur-
ance, and specific to the practice of obstetrics, a decrease in insur-
ance availability.' Insurance premiums have risen for all medical
practice areas, and although the cost is higher in obstetrics, it is
not significantly different from other high-risk specialty areas.
The crisis of availability has been adequately addressed without
ther, while claims for birth-related neurological injuries make up the largest percentage of
obstetric claims, other obstetric injury claims are also of high frequency. Yet these other
claims have not been targeted for specialized legislative treatment. Id.
220. See supra note 30.
221. WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION ExPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr 6 (1991). Medical malpractice and obstetric malpractice are not
the only areas to experience a claims increase, as increases have occurred in all areas of
litigation, making the experience in obstetrics less remarkable, and therefore less justified
for selective treatment. See id.
222. Danzon, supra note 79, at 18-29 (noting also the results of a California Medical
Association study which found that roughly 1 of 20 hospital admissions result in a negli-
gent injury and that this figure may be an underestimate). Danzon's findings are further
bolstered by the conclusions of a recent study conducted by Harvard University on the
incidences of medical negligence. The Harvard investigation concluded that "150,000
Americans are killed annually by medical treatment, with more than half of those deaths
'due to negligence' .... not too many, but rather too few suits were brought for the
negligent medical injury inflicted on patients." Miles Benson, Doctors' Negligence More
Deadly Than Traffic, CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER, May 8, 1993, at A4 (reporting on the
findings of the Harvard study). A recent study published in the Annals of Internal Medi-
cine, based on 8231 cases of medical malpractice over a 15 year span, also concluded
that "contrary to popular belief, unjustified payments are rare." Robert Pear, Medical Mal-
practice Study Finds Unjust Payments are Rare, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1992, § 1, at 42
(reporting on the recently released study).
223. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text. An adult injury claim would gener-
ally involve a shorter time span.
224. See supra notes 83-84, 108, 112-14 and accompanying text.
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abolishing common law rights.' But in 1989, the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences released the results
of its two-year study on the effects of medical professional liability
on the delivery of obstetric services.' Their research found that
obstetric claims represented approximately ten percent of malprac-
tice claims nationwide and accounted for nearly half of all indem-
nity payments. 7 As noted below, almost one-half of the damage
awards for this category of injuries goes toward pain and suffer-
ing." These results, in relation to the discussion above on claim
frequency, suggest that reduction in the severity of these claims
may be accomplished by addressing noncompensatory damages
within the tort system.
2. Removing Claims from Jury Deliberation
Critics of the tort system also argue that juries are unable to
decide claims adequately and as a result verdicts are arbitrary,
excessive, and based on sympathy for plaintiffs, particularly where
the victim is a severely injured infant."29 However, evidence
shows that these allegations are largely unfounded in regard to jury
verdicts in birth-related injury claims." Research for the Institute
of Medicine in which various types of obstetrical and gynecological
injuries were separated by jury verdicts found that while labor and
delivery injury claims had a greater likelihood of success, the inju-
ries were highly correlated with medical mismanagement and negli-
225. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
226. See Bulger & Rostow, supra note 27, at 82.
227. Id. at 82-83. See generally GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE: SIX STATE CASE STUDIES SHOW CLAIMS AND INSURANCE COSTS STILL RISE DE-
SPITE REFORMS (1986) (examining six state malpractice statutes and the cost of medical
malpractice insurance and claims in those states, especially in high risk specialties like
obstetrics, gynecology, and neurosurgery).
228. See infra notes 235, 287-88 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Estrada v. Columbia
Presbyterian Medical, No. 16438/84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1992) (awarding total damages
of $12.7 million, including $8 million for pain and suffering, for medical malpractice that
resulted in permanent brain injury to an infant).
229. Edward C. Martin, Limiting Damages for Pain and Suffering: Arguments Pro and
Con, 10 AM. L. TRIAL ADvOC. 317, 329 (1986). But see Daniels & Andrews, supra note
91, at 163 ("Despite the fact that jury verdicts in medical malpractice cases are roundly
criticized, there have been surprisingly few studies of what actually happens in malpractice
cases that go to court and virtually no studies of cases involving obstetricians and gyne-
cologists.").
230. Daniels & Andrews, supra note 91, at 188, 191 (noting that awards are not exces-
sive given the seriousness of birth-related injuries).
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gent treatment rather than jury arbitrariness3 '"The low success
rates and low award structures for more severe injuries in hysterec-
tomy and tubal ligation cases suggest that juries are not simply
making emotional decisions based solely on severity of injury." 2
While awards may be larger, economic damages are structured
to the cost of medical care and treatment, which is expensive for
this type of injury. 3 Yet critics complain that sympathy is re-
flected in the calculation of excessive noneconomic damages like
pain and suffering.' Pain and suffering awards account for close
to half of jury verdict damage awards235 There is no standard of
calculation by which juries arrive at noneconomic awards. There-
fore, any sympathy for the plaintiff may be reflected in calculations
of noneconomic damages. While arguably the claims of severely
injured infants are deserving of sympathetic awards of higher dam-
ages, such awards place a heavy burden on insurers and possibly
obstetricians if the award exceeds liability coverage. Addressing
this additional burden may remove some of the pressure in the ob-
stetric malpractice situation.
Exceedingly high noneconomic damage awards are not justified
under either the compensation or deterrence rationales underpinning
common law tort liability3 6 A limit imposed on pain and suf-
fering does not infringe on a right of the parent or injured infant
as the award is based on intangible rather than economic loss. If
the award is within the obstetrician's liability coverage, it does not
provide any further incentive to exercise care than other deterrence
mechanisms. But if liability exceeds coverage, it may impose a
financial cost beyond what the obstetrician can bear. The unpredict-
ability of noneconomic awards also affects insurers who cannot
calculate or reflect the cost of future claims in determining
premiums.' Yet problems with the unpredictability of
noneconomic damage awards can be addressed without removal of
231. Id. at 183, 188-91 (asserting that greater care is needed in this area).
232. aI. at 188.
233. See id. at 177 (implying that the medical care costs for injured infants 'are high
because approximately 60% of obstetrical malpractice claims involve permanent injury or
death).
234. See Martin, supra note 229, at 329.
235. DANZoN, supra note 56, at 170; supra note 228.
236. See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
237. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and
Suffering", 83 NW. U. L. REv. 908, 908 (1989).
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birth injury claims from the tort system."
With the exception of the ACE system,"9 the alternative sys-
tems replace a jury's determination with that of an administrative
agency similar to a workers' compensation commission,' with
claims reviewed by medical review panels to determine compensa-
bility. These panels rely on physicians, often obstetricians,2 4 1 to
determine whether claims are compensable. This method is likely
to result in problems similar to those presented by reliance on
medical personnel to provide disciplinary mechanisms for negligent
obstetricians, a process generally recognized as ineffective.242
Particularly when the medical review panel is made up of obste-
tricians deciding causation, the panel may be more likely to find
that an injury was not birth-related. This is particularly true in light
of the current medical controversy over causation of these inju-
ries.243 While modeled after workers' compensation boards, the
structure of these panels would be most analogous to a Worker's
Compensation board made up of employers in the specific field
where the alleged injury occurred. It is highly unlikely that either
panel would be able to avoid its bias, with the resulting bias im-
pacting on those most severely injured by negligent obstetric care.
3. Defensive Medicine
Critics of the tort system allege that the cost of obstetric care
is being driven up by implementation of litigation-avoiding "defen-
sive medicine."' Measures receiving the most attention are fetal
238. See discussion infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text.
239. The ACE system attempts to predefine all compensable injuries, allowing claims to
go directly to the responsible insurer, in a manner similar to the administration of health
or disability insurance. See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 24, at 2837.
240. The Florida and Virginia no-fault statutes are both heard by the states' workers'
compensation boards. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.302(4) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-5001 (Michie 1990).
241. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text. While the Virginia Act does not
specify the makeup of the medical review panel, Florida's plan specifies a panel of one
pediatric neurologist or neurosurgeon, one obstetrician, and one neonatologist or obstetri-
cian, which will review the claim and file a report recommending whether the injury is a
birth-related neurological injury. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.308 (West 1992).
242. See, e.g., Ward, supra note 30, at 452 n.129 (noting that physicians recognize the
proven ineffectiveness of disciplinary measures within the medical community).
243. Id. See supra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
244. See, e.g., Bulger & Rostow, supra note 27, at 85-87 (concluding that the threat of
liability has resulted in the performance of often unnecessary tests and procedures which
in turn creates higher costs with questionable, if any, corresponding increase in the quality
of care).
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monitoring and other diagnostic procedures.2 5
The primary function of fetal surveillance during labor is the
prevention of perinatal asphyxia.2' Fetal heart rate monitoring is
the conventional method. In the majority of studies, fetal heart rate
monitoring has led to an increase in the cesarean section rate,47
which provides a gentler birth when there is a risk of asphyxia.4 8
The American Medical Association and others have criticized some
of the procedures followed by obstetricians as purely defensive
measures used to avoid litigation rather than for any true preven-
tative value.249 However, other research has demonstrated the val-
ue of fetal heart rate monitoring as an effective diagnostic measure,
particularly when combined with fetal scalp blood sampling and
cord blood analysis when the fetal heart rate monitoring is irregu-
lar." Clinical advances in technology are expanding the array of
diagnostic and therapeutic procedures available to detect potential
problems. 1
"Defensive" medicine, rather than being a negative result of
fear of litigation, may support the effectiveness of the tort system
as a deterrent, as defensive medicine may lead to better care and
better results. Further, evidence shows that negligence in obstetrics
is not usually the result of the failure to practice so-called "defen-
sive medicine," but rather is the result of obstetricians' failure to
follow older established procedures of the standard of care.2 The
immunity from tort liability provided by the alternative systems is
even more unjustified in light of the evidence that injury is gener-
ally the result of failure to meet medically established standards of
care rather than purportedly "litigation-driven" standards.
In addition to the issues raised above regarding questionable
245. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE FUTURE OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
10 (1987).
246. Agustsson & Patel, supra note 96, at 171.
247. Id.
248. See Schwartz & Tucker, supra note 2, at 316.
249. AMEmICAN MEDICAL ASSOCtATION, THE FuTURE OF OBSTERICS AND GYNECOLOGY
16, 19 (1987).
250. Agustsson & Patel, supra note 96, at 171-73.
251. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, THE FuTURE OF OBSTEMIUCS AND GYNECOLOGY
15 (1987).
252. Daniels and Andrews found that many of the infant injury claims in their study
were the result of the use of Oxytocin, a labor-inducing drug. Contraindications for use of
Oxytocin began appearing in 1962, and were widely recognized by the medical profession
by the 1970s. Sixteen of the 23 studied Oxytocin injury cases were over situations where
the use of the drug was clearly contraindicated by contemporary medical sources. Daniels
& Andrews, supra note 91, at 189-91.
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justifications for providing alternative treatment of this select cate-
gory of injuries, there are concerns about whether the alternative
systems are adequate replacements for the right to a common law
cause of action. The following section will consider the alternative
systems in light of the standards and goals of the tort system.
B. The Imposition of Liability: The Fault and Causation Inquiry
The tort system asks two initial questions regarding a claim of
medical malpractice: first, whether the injury was caused by the
medical care; and, second, whether the obstetrician (or medical care
provider) was at fault. Part of the plaintiff's prima facie case is the
establishment of causation and fault. 3 The no-fault and selective
no-fault statutes would remove any inquiry into negligence or fault
of the provider.' Some researchers argue that many birth-related
neurological injuries are not caused by negligent treatment during
labor and delivery, but occur prenatally, during pregnancy, without
any fault on the part of the obstetrician.5 Under these circum-
stances, the imposition of liability for negligent treatment during
labor or delivery would be inappropriate. There are, however, two
problems with this position. First, the birth-related neurological
injuries currently being compensated in the tort system and targeted
by the alternative systems are highly correlated with negligence. 56
Second, by removing the fault inquiry under the no-fault systems,
injuries occurring perinatally (during pregnancy) are likely to fall
within the definition of a compensable event. Injuries from birth
defects and maternal drug use are often difficult to distinguish
from the category of injuries designated by the no-fault system. 7
It is highly unlikely that the no-fault systems were intended to be
a compensation plan for injuries from birth defects or maternal
drug useY8 While compensation may benefit the injured infant
(who would not qualify for compensation under the tort system), it
is unfair to accomplish this at the expense of non-negligent obste-
tricians and hospitals contributing to the funding of the systems.
253. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A (1965) (elements of a negligence
claim).
254. See supra Part IV.A., B.
255. See supra note 100.
256. The alternative systems, particularly ACEs, recognize that ACE categories are based
on events that are avoidable and unlikely to occur in the absence of fault. See supra
notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
257. Epstein, supra note 66, at 1469.
258. Id.
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Further, due to the vague role of causation in the no-fault
statutes, litigation is expected to ensue over the causation element
prior to claims being filed with the commissions. 9 The ACE
system is also unlikely to decrease litigation costs.' By confin-
ing compensation to events where there is a strong presumption of
negligence, the system will only remove claims where the issue of
negligence is clear cut, precisely the claims that would not entail
large litigation costs under the tort system.261
Not only will the alternate systems fail to decrease litigation
costs, proving causation may be a roadblock to some claimants
under each of the alternative systems. If a claim is rejected, the
issue of causation would have to be litigated prior to qualification
for compensation. While under the tort system, attorneys' fees for
plaintiffs are generally contingency fees that are paid out of the
damage award, under each of the alternative systems compensation
is calculated strictly in terms of expenses for medical care and
treatment.'sa Assuming a claimant could hire an attorney on a
contingency basis to litigate causation, any cost of this "borderline"
litigation would have to be subtracted from dollars allocated toward
tangible expenses of providing care to the injured infant.
C. Meeting the Tort Objectives: Compensation and Deterrence
The alternative systems are premised in part on assumptions
that the tort system is either failing in its own objectives of com-
pensating the injured and deterring medical malpractice, or achiev-
ing these goals at too great a cost. However, the proposed alterna-
tive systems will not achieve these goals any better, and will work
to the detriment of severely injured infants. The alternative meth-
259. See id. at 1468-70 (arguing that litigation will ensue over many birth defect, mater-
nal drug use, and ambiguous causation cases); Siemdzki, supra note 27, at 559 ("Litiga-
tion over these 'boundary' cases will probably ensue.").
260. See DANZON, supra note 56, at 217-18.
261. Id. Danzon's empirical analysis of claims disposition demonstrates that claims in-
volving clear error tend to be settled out of court, with relatively low litigation costs.
Cases where negligence is in question will remain in the civil justice system, entailing
large litigation costs because the parties cannot come to a settlement agreement.
262. Both the Florida and Virginia statutes do provide for compensation of reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred in the filing of successful claims. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 766.31(l)(c) (west 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009(4) (Michie 1990). It is
unclear, however, whether these provisions would cover attorney's fees for borderline
litigation. The discretionary $100,000 award for noneconomic damages under the Florida
plan could potentially cover attorney fees for such litigation, although there is no indi-
cation that this was the purpose of including the discretionary award in the statute. See
FA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(b).
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ods of addressing obstetric injuries in terms of their ability to pro-
vide fair compensation to the injured infant and socially beneficial
incentives for injury avoidance will be considered below.
The medical malpractice system ties compensation to a finding
of fault. In compensating injuries, a distinction is made between
losses resulting from natural misfortune and self-inflicted behavior,
and losses resulting from the wrongful conduct of another. The tort
system seeks to address the latter,263 leaving the former to meth-
ods of social insurance. One objective of the law in compensating
injuries is to adjust these losses, and to provide compensation to
the injured patient for injuries occurring as a result of the negligent
conduct of another."M The following section will examine the al-
ternative systems in terms of compensating injury.
1. Compensation in the Alternative Systems
It is unlikely that the alternative systems will compensate a
larger number of injured infants, as most of the infants qualifying
for compensation under the alternative systems would have recov-
ered under the tort system.265 The no-fault statutes compensate
irrespective of a showing of fault on the part of the obstetrician,
yet the category of events compensable under such statutes is high-
ly correlated with negligence.2 While the ACE system proposes
the compensation of clearly defined events, those events selected
for compensation are also generally related to fault.267 Similar to
the current system, the AMA proposal also ties compensation of
injuries with a finding of fault, retaining negligence as the principle
decision-rule for compensating.
As noted abo,e, implementation of the alternative compensation
systems will impact claimants who are initially rejected and have
263. See White, supra note 14, at 1495 n.42 (citing DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON MEDICAL LIABILITY AND MALPRACTICE 18
(1987)) ("A compensation system for medical injury should compensate avoidable medical
injury due to provider fault and should not compensate injury which is unavoidable by
standard medical practice.").
264. See supra Part I (discussing objectives of the tort system). See also KEETON ET
AL., supra note 50, at 6 (suggesting that the fundamental principle of tort law is that the
remedy must be based upon socially unreasonable behavior which injures another).
265. Gallup, supra note 11, at 702 (noting that this category of fault-based claims typi-
cally fares well in the tort system). Further, the category is designed specifically to re-
move these successful tort claims from the tort system to reduce the severity of the
claims.
266. Gallup, supra note 11, at 702.
267. See supra notes 160-67 and accompanying text.
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to pursue costly "borderline" litigation to prove causation. But the
greatest impact will be felt by the most severely injured who
would have recovered the largest awards under the tort system for
both economic and noneconomic damages. All of the systems, like
the tort system, provide for compensation of past and future medi-
cal expenses and tangible losses. However, this compensation is
subject to the collateral source rule " and is made in scheduled
payments rather than a lump sum. 9 Such features reduce the
cost of compensation to the fund or insurance system, and also
address cases where the infant dies earlier than life expectancy
calculations or medical expenses are less than what might have
been projectedeo All but the Virginia statute provide some pos-
sibility of compensation for nonpecuniary damages, but in each
system the provision is discretionary and does not clearly state
what the award reflects, such as pain and suffering damages. The
Florida plan is also the only system to specify the actual Amount
of nonpecuniary damages available."7 If the determination is left
to a medical panel, this provision may suffer results similar to
disciplinary actions determined by medical boards. Physicians may
be unwilling to include high nonpecuniary damages if the inclusion
suggests additionally faulty behavior on the part of the obstetrician.
As a result, infants and families who are victims of the most se-
vere obstetric injuries and who would have received the largest
pain and suffering awards under the tort system will stand to lose
the most. Rather than limiting or structuring pain and suffering
awards to provide some jury guidance and insurer predictabili-
ty,272 the alternative systems are likely to remove the award com-
pletely for those most severely injured by physician negligence.
268. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(1)(a) (West 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-
5009(1)(a) to (d) (Michie 1990).
269. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(2) ("The award shall require the immediate
payment of expenses previously incurred and shall require that future expenses be paid as
incurred.")
270. In Boyd, the court upheld an 8.3 million award, two components of which were
future medical expenses and lost earnings, even though the infant died three years after
judgment. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 792-93 (W.D. Va. 1986), affd in part and
rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989), certifying questions to Bulala v. Boyd, 389
S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990), conformed to answers of certified question, 905 F.2d 764 (4th
Cir. 1990).
271. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(b).
272. See discussion infra notes 286-97 and accompanying text.
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2. Deterrent Mechanisms in the Alternative Systems
The second objective of a system should be to provide a level
of deterrence that reduces both the cost of injuries and the cost of
avoiding injuries.' The system should provide incentives that
reduce the frequency and severity of birth-related injuries, while
providing a standard of medical care that promotes optimal injury
avoidance without encouraging nonbeneficial treatment measures.
Reduction in the frequency and severity of birth-related injuries
is central to the deterrence goal. To achieve cost reduction through
deterrence, th3 cause of the injury must be within the physician's
control. If obstetric practices had no effect on the frequency and
severity of birth-related neurological claims, a decreased incentive
to avoid negligent practice might be less cause for concern. How-
ever, as noted previously, studies of claims alleging obstetrical
malpractice as the cause of neurological injury have found substan-
tial connections between questionable practice procedures and re-
sulting impairment.274
The alternative systems, both the no-fault and fault-based pro-
posals, are likely to decrease physicians' incentives to exercise the
proper level of care, 75 and to fail at achieving deterrence. This
result will occur primarily for two reasons: first, the alternative
systems rely almost solely on discipline by existing or revamped
medical boards as their deterrent mechanism, although these have
historically proven highly ineffective as a mechanism of deter-
rence;276 second, the alternative systems fail to take account of
deterrent mechanisms underlying the tort adjudicatory process.
Failure to deter negligence is more likely to occur with state medi-
cal boards not enforcing their own standards, as statistics demon-
strate that a large percentage of malpractice is committed by a
small percentage of physicians.2' These statistics suggest that the
273. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CoSTs OF ACCIDENTS 26-31 (1970) (discussing the reduc-
tion of accident costs generally through the deterrent effect of the tort system).
274. See, e.g., Gallup, supra note 11, at 696 (discussing a 1987 study of 591 obstetrical
malpractice claims); see supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
275. See Gallup, supra note 11, at 700 (commenting that by reducing the intangible
losses and obstetrician responsibility for damages in excess of liability coverage found in
the tort system, the Virginia Act will decrease deterrence). See also Ward, supra note
31, at 433 (arguing that "elimination of fault-based liability is antithetical to the deterrent
goal of the traditional tort system . , and that such a course of action "could result
in increased injuries.").
276. See Gallup, supra note 11, at 696, 700.
277. Id. at 697, 700. Gallup notes that, in the no-fault systems, there is a likelihood of
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negligent physicians have been targeted, but disciplinary actions or
increased educational efforts either have failed or have not been
implemented. If the alternative systems had some other deterrent
mechanisms, reliance on medical disciplinary efforts would be less
of a concern. However, the alternative systems remove the other
deterrent mechanisms of the tort system without providing any
replacement other than ineffective medical disciplinary review.
Some commentators assert that deterrence is the primary justifi-
cation for maintaining tort liability.27 8 The tort system's process
of adjudicating claims accomplishes its deterrent objective through
both economic and nonmonetary means. Injury prevention can be
costly. Without some return on the dollars spent on prevention, the
incentive to take preventative measures will decrease. 9 Avoid-
ance of liability provides an initial incentive to exercise care in the
tort system. Some argue that the deterrent effect of the tort system
is destroyed by the introduction of liability insurance into the
claims process, as it covers all or some of the practitioner's mone-
tary loss associated with a negligence judgment or settlement.'
However, even if insurance covers all monetary loss, there are
nonmonetary costs to the physician in defending a claim of
negligence,sI including the uninsured lost practice time and repu-
tation costs in defending a claim or being found negligent.2 Fur-
ther, the threat of litigation alone has been shown to have a deter-
rent effect upon negligent practices."
"adverse selection." This theory contends that high-risk obstetricians will elect to partici-
pate in the plans while those who are lower risk will reject the additional payment re-
quired by the funding. Id.
278. See, e.g., DANZON, supra note 56, at 9 (deterrence of negligence by encouraging
optimal investment in the prevention of injury by physicians is primary economic rationale
of tort system).
279. Id. at 10.
280. Id. at 118 (discussing liability insurance and its effect of externalizing, or insulating
physicians from, the monetary costs associated with malpractice).
281. Id. at 135.
282. See Gallup, supra note 11, at 700 (addressing the nonmonetary costs imposed by
the tort system through "lost time, embarrassment, and worry, and risk [of] diminished
professional reputation").
283. Many doctors have responded that the threat of liability has altered their practice.
[According to a 1985 survey conducted by the American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, thirty-five percent of the obstetricians surveyed report-
ed that they had changed the way they practiced obstetrics as a result of the
risks of professional liability. Among the changes reported were the increased
use of testing and other diagnostic and monitoring procedures, the increased use
of written informed consent, more frequent consultations with other physicians,
increased attempts to provide written or tape-recorded information to patients,
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The alternative systems remove the deterrent effect of uninsur-
able costs, by not requiring physician participation in the claims
hearing" and removing claims from the tort process, thereby re-
moving lost time costs, the threat of reputation damage in the
event of a finding of liability, and the moral deterrent effects of
the tort system. Yet this is done without any adequate replacement.
Even the threat of financial liability, present in the tort system if
damage awards exceed liability coverage, is removed by compen-
sating the victim entirely through established funds or third-party
insurance.
In the final analysis, the alternative systems may reduce the
financial magnitude of obstetric claims by decreasing compensation
to the infants and families most severely and permanently harmed
by negligence. Further, such systems risk increasing the frequency
of injury to infants through ineffective deterrence. The possibility
of increased incidents of birth-related neurological injury undercuts
any potential benefit to physicians and insurers through exclusive
treatment of this narrow category of injury. Unlike the alternatives
proposed, the tort system already incorporates deterrent mechanisms
to address the future frequency of claims by providing incentives
for injury-avoidance. While increased monitoring efforts by medical
review boards should be encouraged, these efforts alone cannot be
relied on as the sole deterrent. Problems surrounding the severity
of claims can be adequately addressed in other ways while main-
taining the traditional tort system. This could be achieved through
modification of damage awards.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MAINTAINING THE COMMON LAW
CAUSE OF ACTION
The severity of birth-related neurological injury claims, in part,
is a natural result of the intensity of the injury. This is reflected in
and more frequent explanation of the potential risks of a recommended proce-
dure (citations omitted).
Bulger & Rostow, supra note 27, at 86-87.
284. See David G. Duff, Compensation for Neurologically Impaired Infants: Medical No-
Fault in Virginia, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 391, 418-19 (1990). Duff argues that the no-
fault statutes disassociate the physician and hospital from involvement in claims resolution.
through "no provision for their participation in formulating any response to the claim. nor
for their appearance at the hearing . I..." ld  Instead, the commissions act as parties in
place of the physician and hospital. This disassociation results in a claims process where-
by the deterrent effect associated with traditional litigation is minimized, if not eliminated.
Id.
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the cost of compensating for tangible economic losses, including
medical care and maintenance. Efforts to limit damage awards
through caps on the maximum amount of economic damages may
face constitutional challenges.' However, there are permissible
methods of reducing the severity of claims by restructuring damage
awards that would not infringe upon the rights of injured infants or
families, and would provide both guidance to juries in determining
noneconomic award calculations and predictability to physicians
and insurers, while still meeting the objectives of compensation and
deterrence. Three methods which, if used conjunctively, would
reduce the severity of claims are structuring of pain and suffering
awards, periodic payment of economic damages, and the abrogation
of the collateral source rule.
Noneconomic damages make up an estimated 40 percent of
awards determined by jury verdicts.286 In birth-related injury
claims, this percentage is likely to be considerably higher.s? Yet
these amounts are "the least well-defined and most variable compo-
nent of damage awards,""5 with no legally-provided objective
benchmark by which juries calculate intangible loss. 9 The unpre-
dictability of these claims threatens the liability insurance system,
as the risk of loss cannot be calculated and spread through premi-
ums.
290
"Pain and suffering" is a term covering several categories of
nonpecuniary loss, including the physiological pain of the injury,
anguish, emotional distress, long term loss of love and companion-
285. See, e.g. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781 (W.D. Va. 1986) (holding that award
caps restrict the jury's ability to assess damages and are therefore violative of the Seventh
Amendment), affid in part and rev'd in part, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989) (damage cap
constitutional), certifying questions to Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va. 1990), con-
formed to answers of certified questions, 905 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1990). See also supra
notes 205-11 and accompanying text (discussing other potential constitutional challenges).
286. DANZON, supra note 56, at 170.
287. This is probably due in part to the nature of the claim in that damages are
awarded to both the infant and the parents. However, the magnitude of the award is also
likely to be a result of the lack of jury guidance in determining intangible loss and some
jury sympathy for an infant severely injured by physician negligence.
288. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 237, at 909.
289. id. at 910-12; DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDmES 545 (1973)
("Courts have usually been content to say that pain and suffering damages should amount
to 'fair compensation' or a 'reasonable amount,' without any more definite guide.").
290. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 237, at 908. See also PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL 54-56 (1991) (noting the erratic nature of the process by which
the size of pain and suffering awards are determined).
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ship for family members, and the loss of enjoyment of life.29
Although some reformers argue for abolishment of pain and suffer-
ing awards entirely,292 compensation for intangible loss is largely
recognized as a legitimate element of damages.293 Because these
awards contemplate conscious pain and suffering, the argument
could be posed that the award is meritless for this severely injured
class of infants, where conscious pain and suffering is unlikely to
be experienced by the newborn victim. However, complete elimina-
tion of this category of damages would not be wise as it could po-
tentially result in "moral hazard," with efforts by providers and
insurers to make borderline cases meet the definition of this narrow
category to avoid higher noncompensatory damages. In addition,
complete removal of this form of damages in cases where pain and
suffering is not consciously experienced by the victim would have
the greatest adverse impact upon those most severely injured,2'
and would not provide any more guidance in jury calculations of
noncompensatory damages to the parents of the infant.295
However, pain and suffering awards could be structured to
guide juries in their calculations and also provide greater predict-
ability for insurers. One attractive method for accomplishing this is
through scheduled noneconomic damages computed using an
"award matrix," an approach proposed by Bovjberg, Sloan and
Blumstein.296 Under this system, a matrix of values would be cal-
culated to award fixed damage amounts according to the severity
of the injury.297 A variation on this method could allow some
range of values within which the jury may determine an award.
This approach would still provide some flexibility in the jury cal-
culation, and yet impose an overall structure to guide juries.
Another method for reducing the severity of claims would be
291. WELER, supra note 290, at 34.
292. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 237, at 931 nn.120-23 and accompanying
text.
293. See id. at 909, 928; see also DOBBS, supra note 289, at 136-38.
294. A similar problem is presented by caps, or upward limits, on pain and suffering
damages where jury verdicts are reduced to an amount less than or equal to the cap's
ceiling. To illustrate, with a $500,000 cap, if a jury awarded $500,000 to a relatively
minor but sympathetic injury claim, the verdict would stand, whereas a larger verdict for
a severe injury would be reduced to the same $500,000 cap. WEmLER, supra note 290, at
59.
295. It is also possible that juries would compensate for the exclusion of awards for the
pain and suffering of the infant by increasing the amount of awards to parents.
296. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 237, at 939-53.
297. See id.
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through the periodic payment of malpractice awards as expenses
are incurred by the victim. Payments could then cease in the event
of the infant's death.2 98 This prevents "potential 'windfalls' result-
ing from damage awards based on inaccurate estimates of future
medical expenses .... ,2" It also avoids results like that in Boyd
v. Bulala, where the infant died within three years after an award
including over $3 million for future medical expenses and lost
earnings." While the tragic death of an infant makes the award
difficult to characterize as a windfall,30 it is still difficult to justi-
fy, in terms of either compensation or deterrence, payment for
medical expenses which will never be incurred. The payments do
not offset any actual economic loss, and are likely to be funded by
liability insurance. The potential windfall to an insurer relieved of
further periodic payments in cases of death is illusory, as it is not
the insurer's behavior which is sought to be deterred through the
tort system. Further, deterrence in the tort system is accomplished
to a large extent through other nonmonetary measures.ea Periodic
payments made as expenses are incurred, with cessation in the
event of death, is essentially the compensation approach of the
alternative systems. An important difference between such alterna-
tives and the tort system, in terms of compensation, is that parents
like the Boyds would still receive noneconomic damages. The
alternative systems make these damages discretionary. In the alter-
native systems, in the event of infant death, payments would cease.
Because there is no guarantee of a noneconomic award, the parents
would receive no recognition of intangible loss upon the infant's
injury or death."3 Under the tort system, although this approach
298. State provisions mandating periodic payments of medical malpractice awards ceas-
ing upon death of the patient have been upheld. See, e.g., Florida Patient's Compensation
Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783, 789 (Fla. 1985); State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie,
261 N.W.2d 434, 443 (Wis. 1978).
299. Ward, supra note 30, at 434.
300. In Boyd, the district court rejected the defendant's motion to amend the action to
convert it to a wrongful death action or order remittitur, as the judgment had already
been finalized and amendment was therefore not allowed by the relevant statutes. Boyd v.
Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 795-96 (W.D. Va. 1986), affd in part and rev'd in part, 877
F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989), certifying questions to Bulala v. Boyd, 389 S.E.2d 670 (Va.
1990), conformed to answers of certified question, 905 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1990).
301. But see Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 838 (N.H. 1980) ("[A]Ithough there may
be a windfall to the claimant's family if the periodic payments are not terminated at the
claimant's death, there is also a windfall benefit to the defendant's insurer . . . if the
claimant dies.")
302. See supra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
303. In a case like Boyd, the family would potentially receive damages equal to the
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would stop payment in the event of the infant's death, the parents
would usually have already been compensated to some extent for
intangible loss through the tort award for noncompensatory pain
and suffering damages.
Another method to reduce the severity of claims is abrogation
of the collateral source rule.3" "Statutes permitting or mandating
the offset of collateral benefits have apparently reduced malpractice
claim severity by eleven to eighteen percent ... relative to compa-
rable states without collateral source offset" rules.3 5 The econom-
ic costs are still compensated, though not directly through the
obstetrician's liability insurer. Similar to periodic payment sched-
ules, offset by collateral sources should have no affect on deter-
rence particularly where the offset method is imposed in a system
where other deterrent mechanisms exist.
CONCLUSION
Birth-related neurological injuries impose high costs on injured
infants and families, obstetric care providers, and the liability insur-
ance system. They impose severe damages and costly medical
expenses for injured infants and families. Due to their severity, and
because they are correlated with obstetric negligence, they frequent-
ly result in successful tort litigation and some of the largest mal-
practice awards. As a result, this category of injuries has become
the focus of reform efforts to decrease the frequency and severity
of obstetric malpractice claims. Yet while reformers attempt to
decrease the number and cost of claims for obstetricians and insur-
ers, they are doing so at the cost of the rights of injured infants
and families who are being adversely impacted by the abrogation
of the common law cause of action.
The malpractice experience in obstetrics generally and this
category of claims in particular is not so significantly different
from other medical practice areas as to justify special treatment.
cost of the three years of medical expenses incurred prior to the infant's death, and noth-
ing more. This result is particularly unsettling in light of the Virginia statute's failure to
include any deterrent mechanisms.
304. Legislation implementing abrogation of the collateral source rule has been held
constitutionally valid. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 695 P.2d 665, 684-85
(Cal.), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 892 (1985). The alternative systems proposed also
support recognition of collateral sources as a method of decreasing costs. See, e.g.,
Virginia's Plan, supra notes 134, 137 and accompanying text.
305. Danzon, supra note 79, at 78.
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Further, systems based on variations of no-fault and administrative
agency models are not adequate replacements for the tort system.
By compensating for actual economic loss only as it is incurred,
the systems do not guarantee any compensation for noneconomic
damages, a recognized category of loss. Removing claims from the
jury process and placing them at the discretion of medical panels
made up largely of obstetric care providers will result in bias
against compensability, and is likely to result in costly "borderline"
litigation over causation. In addition, it provides a shield of immu-
nity to obstetricians for a category of claims strongly associated
with negligent care. Economic and moral deterrence, and the ben-
eficial incentives toward preventative medicine, are removed by the
alternative systems without any reliable deterrent mechanism im-
posed in replacement.
Finally, in addressing the frequency and severity of claims, the
alternative systems merely shift claims frequency to an alternative
forum, rather than reduce the number of claims brought. To reduce
claims severity, abolishment of the common law cause of action is
both unnecessary and unjustified when effective and equitable
methods could be implemented within the tort system, such as
structuring "pain and suffering" awards, using periodic payments
for incurred expenses, and accounting for contributions from collat-
eral sources, without eliminating access to the tort system that is
available to all other victims of medical malpractice.
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